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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS 
 This dissertation spans topics related to global trade, oil prices, optimum 
currency areas, the eurozone, monetary independence, capital controls and the 
international monetary policy trilemma. It consists of four chapters and three essays. 
Chapter one provides a brief summary of all three essays. Chapter two investigates the 
impact of oil prices on global trade. It is concluded that when oil prices increase, 
countries start trading relatively more with their neighbors. As an application this 
chapter provides a new estimate of the eurozone effect on trade. Chapter three 
continues to study the eurozone and asks whether it is an optimum currency area using 
the member countries’ desired monetary policies. It is concluded that Greece, Spain, 
and Ireland have desired policies that are the least compatible with the common euro 
policy and are therefore the least likely to have formed an optimum currency area with 
the euro. Chapter four provides a new methodology in testing the international 
trilemma hypothesis. It is concluded that the trilemma holds in the context of the Asian 
countries. 
KEYWORDS: Capital controls, the Taylor rule, optimum currency area, monetary 
independence, gravity model, oil price 
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1 Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on international macroeconomics with topics related to 
global trade, currency unions, monetary independence, and capital controls. 
The first essay studies the impact of oil prices on global trade. It concludes that 
oil prices have a distributional effect on trade.  In particular when oil prices increase, 
trade becomes relatively more localized as countries trade more with their neighbors. 
On the other hand, when they decrease trade becomes relatively more dispersed as 
countries start trading more with distant partners. As an application of the hypothesis, 
this essay provides a more realistic estimate of the eurozone effect on trade (trade 
within the euro members). The creation of the eurozone corresponded with a major oil 
price increase since 1999. As the euro countries tend to be closer together, the oil price 
increase can explain part of why trade increased more within the eurozone compared to 
the country-pairs outside the eurozone they are normally compared to. When the oil 
price increase since 1999 is taken into account the eurozone effect on trade is reduced 
by as much as a third.  
In the second essay I continue to study the eurozone and ask whether it is an 
optimum currency area by assessing the cost of joining. A large cost of joining arises 
from the fact that countries have to give up their own monetary autonomy in order to 
share a common currency, and the common monetary policies may not be fully 
appropriate for all members. In this essay I approximate the Taylor-rule based interest 
rate as the desired policy of each member. Countries that have own desired policies 
similar to those of the ECB are said to form an optimum currency area with the euro; 
further as their desired policies are being realized it is as if they have retained their 
monetary independence. On the other hand, countries that have desired policies 
different from the ECB policies are said to have paid a large cost for joining as their 
desired policies are not being realized; in this case the countries do not form an 
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optimum currency area and are considered monetarily dependent. The results show this 
to be the case for Spain, Ireland, and Greece.  
The third essay applies the above monetary independence methodology to 
countries outside currency unions and provides a new way to measure the international 
trilemma hypothesis - the tradeoff between exchange rate stability, monetary 
independence, and capital controls. Using the traditional covered interest rate parity 
condition we are able to construct measures of the trilemma components and thus 
confirm the trilemma's existence in the context of the Asian countries. In particular we 
find that countries with greater exchange rate flexibility and capital controls have more 
monetary independence. We also augment the traditional monetary independence 
regression to include each country’s desired interest rate. The results show that the 
most monetary dependent countries become significantly more independent after the 
desired interest rate is included. 
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2 The Impact of Oil Prices and Trade with an Application to the Euro’s Trade Effect 
2.1 Introduction 
In macroeconomics oil price changes, being motivated by the 1970’s stagflation 
period, have generally been associated with the role they play in the overall economy. 
The literature treats increases in the oil price as contemporaneously exogenous shocks 
and then uses VARs to study the economy’s response to these shocks.1 Unlike this 
mainstream literature, the aim of this study is to explore the way oil prices alter the 
patterns of global trade. This research considers oil prices from the perspective of the 
trade literature where they can be seen as influencing trade costs.2 In theory, changes in 
trade costs will only alter the allocation or the distribution of trade, and therefore the 
way oil prices influence trade through their short run impact on the economy is beyond 
the scope of this paper.3 Nonetheless, any changes through the economy should not 
really impact the trade distribution results presented here.  
In present times, crude oil is the most significant driving force behind world 
transportation, supplying 93 percent of its energy needs (IEA, 2012). Since the last 
decade, world oil prices have dramatically increased from an average of twenty dollars a 
barrel in 1999 (in 2005 dollars) to reaching over ninety dollars a barrel in 2008. Despite 
these drastic changes, surprisingly little to no notable research has formally investigated 
crude oil’s impact on global trade.4 It is reasonable to assume that oil prices are related 
to trade costs in particular shipping, and thus changes in shipping will likely drive 
changes in trade. In a regression, Hummels (2007) confirms that fuel costs play an 
important role in the determination of ad valorem freight costs. Then, the literature has 
shown that shipping costs significantly influence trade (Geraci and Prewo,1977, 
Harrigan,1993, Hummels,1999, and Hummels, Lugovskyy, and Skiba,2009). Further, if 
                                                          
1 Some notable papers include Hamilton (1983, 1996), Rotemberg and Woodford(1996), Blanchard and 
Gali(2007), and Kilian(2009). 
2 For an extensive review of trade costs and their influence on trade see Anderson and van 
Wincoop(2004). 
3 For example, Backus and Crucini(2000) and Kilian, Rebucci, and Spatafora(2009) study the way oil price 
shocks effect the terms of trade and/or the trade balance. 
4 Brun et al. (2005) incorporate oil prices as a purely time variant variable in the gravity model. 
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shipping costs are assumed to be (partly) proxied by distance, it is well known that they 
play a central role in trade behavior. 
 Trade might be impacted in different ways. The gravity model of trade can be 
used for theoretical predictions.5 One possibility is that a change in the oil price leads to 
the same percent change in shipping/trade costs for all countries. However if this is the 
case then theoretically there should be no change in trade.6 Alternatively, oil prices 
might have a different impact on trade costs (and therefore trade) depending on 
distance. This paper argues that as oil prices rise, countries will tend to increase trade 
with their neighbors relative to countries further away. This way trade becomes more 
localized relative to before. On the other hand, when oil prices fall, distance becomes 
less of a factor and trade becomes more dispersed. This is a reasonable hypothesis; as 
shipping costs are generally a more significant portion of a product’s price for longer 
distances, changes in shipping will likely have a greater effect on the product’s final 
delivered price for the longer distance. The gravity model of trade is then able to explain 
how these changes in shipping produce inverse changes in trade depending on the 
distance.  
This distributional oil price effect is formally tested here by introducing an oil 
price-distance interaction variable in a panel fixed effects gravity regression using all 
world countries. This type of regression controls for all time invariant country-pair 
specific unobservables, and therefore exploits the within country-pair variation of trade 
over time. Further, year dummies are also included to control for overall year specific 
world trade effects. The interaction variable then does not capture absolute trade 
changes but just relative trade changes due to the different country-pair distances. In 
                                                          
5 The gravity model of trade is an important empirical tool in the trade literature. The model states that 
the trade value between two regions largely depends negatively on their distance and positively on their 
GDPs. Here, trade is analogous to gravity in that the gravitational pull between two bodies depends on 
their mass and distance. For early works see Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), and Linnemann (1966). 
For a review of more recent works see Karlaftis et al. (2010). 
6 The general equilibrium version of the gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) predicts that 
the gravity equation is homogenous of degree zero in trade costs. In other words, if oil prices change 
trade costs by the same percentage for all countries (including internally), then there will be no change in 
the value traded (assuming GDPs stay constant). 
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other words, the term captures the magnitude of a change in world trade dispersion 
due to a change in the oil price. In all the specifications, the interaction effect turns out 
to be significant and with the correct sign, implying that global trade becomes more 
localized when oil prices increase.  
This oil price interaction also makes the panel gravity equation more complete 
by accounting for time varying shipping costs. This might have many applications, one of 
which is the eurozone effect on trade.7 This effect measures the percentage increase in 
trade within the countries of the eurozone that is due to the sharing of the common 
currency. It is worth to reconsider this effect as the eurozone has recently been in 
turmoil and its existence has come into question. The methodology of estimation is 
generally done by including a eurozone dummy variable in a panel fixed effects gravity 
regression.8 The coefficient in-front of the dummy then acts like a difference-in-
differences estimate as it compares how trade changed within the eurozone members 
relative to other industrialized country-pairs before and after 1999. Recent estimates 
and the estimates from this paper (without accounting for oil prices) point to a 
eurozone effect of roughly 10%. However, as can be seen in Figure 2.1, oil prices have 
dramatically increased since 1999.  As the eurozone members tend to be close together, 
the oil price increase can explain part of why trade increased more within the eurozone 
relative to the industrialized countries outside the eurozone they are normally 
compared to. Based on the regression specifications, it is concluded that the eurozone 
effect falls to less than 7% once oil prices are taken into account and to less than 5% 
after the general equilibrium effects are taken into account.9  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses theory and 
gives evidence for the link between oil prices, shipping costs, and trade. Section 2.3 
                                                          
7 This effect falls under the umbrella of estimations used to estimate the currency union effect of trade 
(Rose, 2000, and Glick and Rose, 2002, Rose and van Wincoop, 2001). 
8 This methodology has been commonly used in currency union estimations, and in particular the 
eurozone (Micco, Stein, and Ordonez, 2003, Frankel, 2010, and Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
9 The general equilibrium effects take into account changes in the multilateral resistance terms, and are 
therefore another contribution of this paper. 
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formally tests the above hypothesis by incorporating an oil price-distance interaction 
variable in a gravity equation. Section 2.4 provides the specifications and results from 
the traditional gravity model. Section 2.5 applies the interaction variable to the more 
modern Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) general equilibrium (GE) version of the 
gravity model and reports the GE estimation results and impact of oil prices. Section 2.6 
includes the interaction variable in estimating the eurozone effect on trade. Lastly, 
section 2.7 concludes. The figures, tables and appendix are at the end. 
2.2 Oil Prices and Shipping Costs 
This section first introduces theory and then provides real world evidence as to 
how oil prices influence shipping costs and therefore trade.  
2.2.1 The Link between Oil Prices, Shipping, and Trade 
Hummels (2007 p.134) states that consumers are sensitive to the final delivered 
price of a product and not just its shipping cost or production price alone.10 For 
example, consider two similar products with a production price of 10 dollars each, and 
that one type has to travel a short distance and the other a long distance to reach their 
destination with shipping costs 1, and 2 dollars per unit respectively. Now suppose oil 
prices increase and the shipping costs double for both distances. The ratio of the 
delivered prices before the oil price increase was $12 to $11, but after it becomes $14 to 
$12. In other words, the further product became more expensive relative to the closer 
product. Intuitively, this is because shipping costs are a smaller fraction of the 
production price for the closer destination, so any proportional changes to the shipping 
costs will have a smaller impact on the delivered price for the closer destination. This 
change in the relative delivered prices will thus drive change in the total value of the 
product traded. Therefore, it is the changes in the ad-valorem11 shipping costs that 
                                                          
10 Suppose a product is produced at an origin and travels to a destination. Then the delivered price of a 
product is defined as the product’s price at the origin plus the shipping cost to the destination. 
11 An ad valorem shipping cost is the shipping cost of a product expressed as a fraction of the production 
price of a product. In this case 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 shipping cost = delivered price of a product
production price of a product
 where 
delivered price = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 shipping cost +  production price. For example if a product is $10 at the 
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really matter. The theoretical gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 
denoted hereafter as AvW, likewise confirms this (see Appendix C for a summary of the 
model). In AvW the trade costs (including shipping) are clearly ad valorem. As footnote 6 
implies, in order for changes in trade to occur, there has to be changes in the relative 
trade costs. In the example, even though the actual shipping costs doubled for both 
distances, the ad-valorem shipping costs (and delivered prices) increased by a greater 
percentage for the longer distance. According to the AvW gravity model (with 𝜎𝜎 > 1), 
this increase will drive a relative decrease in the total value exported to the longer 
distance.  
In conclusion, if countries further apart have a higher ad valorem shipping cost 
to begin with12, and an oil price hike increases the actual shipping cost by the same 
percentage for all distances, then the ad valorem shipping cost (and delivered price) will 
increase by a larger fraction for countries further apart.13 In this case, consumers will 
find that products further away have become relatively more expensive and will 
substitute towards the cheaper products closer to or at the home country. The opposite 
will be true when oil prices decrease. 
The above argument was made considering that the actual shipping cost 
increased by the same percentage for both short and long distances. However, in the 
real world the actual shipping cost might realistically increase by a larger percentage for 
the longer distance; however, this will not change the basic result. For example, 
consider the total shipping cost as the sum of a fixed cost and a variable cost. For 
simplicity, assume that the fixed cost is for the loading and unloading of cargo, and is 
independent of the distance traveled, while the variable cost is the distance traveled 
                                                                                                                                                                             
production location and the shipping to a particular destination costs $2, then the ad valorem shipping 
cost is 1.2. 
12 This is shown in Figure 2 (discussed in the next subsection) for countries that are more than 4000 miles 
apart to countries that are less than 4000 miles apart, and is also consistent with empirical results. In the 
AvW gravity model distance can be seen as a proxy for ad valorem shipping costs. In the real world its 
estimated trade cost impact is usually always significantly negative.  
13 This can be seen from the formula: 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 shipping cost = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 shipping cost
production price
+ 1. As the AvW 
model is a general equilibrium model, the production prices will also change slightly because of changing 
relative ad valorem shipping costs, but this will not change the overall results. 
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times the oil price (a proxy for the fuel cost). Then, for a given transported product, a 
doubling of the oil price will double the variable cost, and will thus increase the total 
shipping cost by a larger percentage for the longer distance. The logic here is that the 
variable cost is a much larger fraction of the total shipping cost for the longer distance 
to begin with; therefore, any changes to the variable cost will impact the longer distance 
by more.  
2.2.2 Real World Evidence 
According to Annex A in the IEA (2012) – World Energy Outlook, as of 2010, 93% 
of the world’s energy needs in transportation are met through petroleum. Petroleum 
based products mainly include petrol (gasoline) for cars and small boats; diesel for 
trucks, trains, and ships; and kerosene for aircraft (Gilbert and Perl, 2013, p.120). All 
these products are made from oil distillation, and so they are highly responsive to the 
price of oil.14 
 Although, oil constitutes a large portion of transportation energy needs, it is 
important to analyze whether changes in these energy costs play a significant role in 
changing ad valorem shipping costs. A way to obtain ad valorem shipping costs is to 
compare the ratios of CIF (cost, insurance and freight) imports to FOB (free on board) 
exports. When products are exported internationally, their value is recorded without 
the shipping cost and insurance. When they are imported, their value is recorded with 
the shipping cost and insurance. The IMF Direction of Trade Statistics has annual data on 
CIF imports, and corresponding FOB exports for each exporter-importer pair. Then, for 
all world exporter-importer and year (1952-2012), the CIF to FOB ratio is constructed as 
a measure of the ad valorem shipping cost for the particular pair in the given year.15 This 
paper follows Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) in restricting the data to the reasonable 
                                                          
14 See Emmons and Neely (2007), and Borenstein et al.(1997) for the behavior of petrol. 
15 Inferring ad valorem shipping costs from this ratio has received criticisms (Hummels and Lugovskyy, 
2006). However this paper does not use the shipping costs for any formal results but just for a visual big 
picture. To my knowledge using the ratios is the standard way of obtaining a long time series on ad 
valorem shipping costs for all world country-pairs. 
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values of the ratio, between 1 and 2, implying an ad valorem shipping cost of 0% to 
100% of the shipment value. 
After the unreasonable observations are removed, for each year, the sum of all 
world imports divided by the sum of all world exports is then used to construct an 
overall ratio for the world ad valorem shipping cost. The middle “overall” curve in Figure 
2.2 shows how this ratio has changed over the years. There are clear ups and downs, 
with some of the trend corresponding to the log of the real Brent Crude oil price (black 
curve). However, theoretically, the overall level of ad valorem costs is not going to 
change the distribution of trade. It is actually important to compare how the ad valorem 
shipping cost has changed for the different distances. The distance is taken to be the 
great circle distance calculated from the geographic center of the countries using 
coordinates from the CIA World Factbook. The average distance in the sample is around 
4000 miles, so the “dist>4k” and “dist<4k” show the shipping costs only for pairs more 
than 4000 miles apart, and less than 4000 miles apart respectively. In other words, the 
“dist>4k” curve represents 
 ∑ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎>4𝑘𝑘
∑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎>4𝑘𝑘
   for each year.  It is clear from the graph 
that, in general, country pairs more than 4000 miles apart have higher ad valorem 
shipping costs than countries less than 4000 miles apart. The overall trend for all curves 
does appear to be similar. It is a bit unusual that the trend increases in the 1990s and 
then decreases in the 2000s – the opposite in the movement of the oil price. 
The overall trend behavior of the ad valorem shipping costs is of no interest in 
this paper, as this by itself will not alter trade.16 What is of interest is how expensive the 
longer distance is relative to the shorter distance, and so it is ultimately the difference 
between the two outer curves that will determine the behavior of trade. The graph in 
Figure 2.2 does show evidence that these shipping costs were of similar magnitude 
when oil prices were low (in the 90s), but became vastly different when they were high 
(in the 70s and 2000s), with the dist>4k becoming relatively more expensive than the 
                                                          
16 Theory predicts that there will be no change in trade allocation if ad-valorem trade costs changed by 
the same percentage everywhere (including internally) – see footnote 6.  
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dist<4k. To compare the shipping cost of the longer distance to the shorter distance, the 
ratio of the two ad valorem costs  
 ∑ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎>4𝑘𝑘
∑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎>4𝑘𝑘
/  ∑ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎<4𝑘𝑘∑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎<4𝑘𝑘   is used. 
Figure 2.3, the blue curve, shows how this ratio changes throughout the years. As can be 
seen, there is a more clear fit that corresponds with oil prices. The smallest difference 
appears to be in 2002, and then a large jump until around 2005 where the shipping cost 
difference does appear to remain high afterwards. A more extreme case is shown in the 
darker “dist>9k/dist<2k” curve, which compares shipping for a distance of greater than 
9000 miles to shipping for a distance of less than 2000 miles. It is clearly seen that this 
curve is even more correlated with the oil price. Changes in relative shipping costs do 
appear to be volatile before the 1970s, however, world trade was low then (and even 
lower for distances > 9000 miles), and perhaps the spikes are the pricing decisions of 
just a few large shipping firms or for just a few large shipments. The oil price was also 
highly regulated at this time and non-price rationing of oil was commonly used 
(Hamilton, 2011).  Furthermore, there are different indexes used to measure oil price. In 
Hamilton (1983), the producer price index of crude oil shows several mild shocks to the 
oil price in the 50s and 60s. The first is from the removal of the oil price controls in 1953. 
The second is from the Suez Canal crisis that blocked shipments through the canal in 
1956-57. As supply increases after opening, there is an oil price decrease in 1959. There 
are also a couple of mild increases in oil price in the late 60s. 
As seen from Figure 2.3, when oil prices rise, ad valorem shipping costs became 
more expensive for the longer distance relative to the shorter distance, and vice versa 
when oil prices fall. Then, in accordance with the gravity model, the relative increase in 
the costs for the longer distance will drive trade to become more localized, while the 
relative decrease will drive trade to become more dispersed. According to Figure 2.3, 
the magnitudes might not seem large. For example, the difference between the over 
9000 mile and the below 2000 mile ad valorem cost was around 5% in 1999, but rose to 
15% by 2008. Although this is a relative difference of roughly 10%, according to the AvW 
gravity model it has a substantial impact on trade because in the model the goods are 
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generally seen to be highly substitutable. For example, if 𝜎𝜎 is assumed to be around 5 
(as in AvW), this implies a multiplying factor of 4 (elasticity of trade costs is 1 − 𝜎𝜎) for 
the percent decrease in trade. It is difficult to obtain actual numbers for the decrease 
because this will depend on the delivered prices of all potential partners; see equation 
(4c) in Appendix C, but in general this can be interpreted as around a 40% drop in trade 
for the >9000k distance relative to the <2000k distance when oil prices increase from 
$20 in 1999 to $90 in 2008. 
2.3 The Interaction Term and Estimation 
The previous section provided an argument and evidence for how oil prices 
would change trade. The goal of this section is to introduce the methodology in actually 
testing the hypothesis. The basic idea is that an oil price-distance interaction term will 
be incorporated in a gravity regression. 
2.3.1 The Interaction Term 
The purpose of the interaction term is to show that the percent change in trade, 
due to an oil price change, also depends on the distance. Ultimately, this term is to 
capture the effect that trade becomes more localized when oil prices increase and more 
dispersed when oil prices decrease. In other words, this will measure changes in trade 
dispersion17. 
Consider the following gravity equation:  
         𝑇𝑇 = 𝑌𝑌1
𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌2
𝛽𝛽2t       with      t =  𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽3𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽4𝑣𝑣𝛽𝛽5𝑔𝑔
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  
Where: 𝑇𝑇 is a measure of trade between two regions, the 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 are their GDPs, 𝑥𝑥 is the 
distance, and 𝑔𝑔 is the oil price. Taking logs ⇒ 
(1)      ln(𝑇𝑇) =  𝛽𝛽1 ln𝑌𝑌1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ln𝑌𝑌2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln 𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽4 ln𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  
                                                          
17 Perhaps the term “trade globalization” may also be used, but this term may just be too general. 
According to Chase-Dunn et al.(2000) trade globalization refers to the overall world openness to 
international trade.  
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Here 𝛽𝛽3 can be seen as the traditional distance elasticity, 𝛽𝛽4 as an overall oil price 
elasticity, and  𝛽𝛽5𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  as the interaction term of interest. The variable contains a 
more general form of 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥   rather than simply 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥.  
The percent change in trade given an oil price increase is: 
(2)        
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇)
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
=
𝛽𝛽4
𝑔𝑔
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔−1𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  
Then consider two separate distances {𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2: 𝑥𝑥2 > 𝑥𝑥1}  
When oil prices increase, the percent change in trade should be lower/more negative 
the greater the distance, and so the following must hold:  
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇)
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
�
𝑒𝑒2
<  
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇)
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
�
𝑒𝑒1
 
This can then be represented as simply taking the derivative with respect to 𝑥𝑥.  
  (3)       
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇)𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
=  
𝑎𝑎2 ln(𝑇𝑇)
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
= 𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔−1𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥−1 < 0   
Because oil price and distance are assumed greater than 0, the condition required for (3) 
to hold is:            
       (4)       𝛽𝛽5𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 < 0 
(3) is really a measure of the additional trade decrease in country-pairs18 that are a unit 
distance apart. As an example, consider 4 country pairs: CP1 through CP4, and assume 
that they each fit the gravity equation above. Then consider each having the following 
distances: CP1 with distance = 1, CP2 with distance = 2, CP3 with distance = 3, CP4 with 
distance = 4. Further, assume that after an oil price increase, trade decreases for CP1.19 
                                                          
18 A country-pair is a pairing of any two countries. 
19 This is a simplifying assumption to make the language more clear. As can be seen from (2), whether 
there is an actual decrease in trade is unknown because there are no assumptions made on 𝛽𝛽4. As the 
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Then, (3) implies that trade further decreases for CP2, even more so for CP3, and CP4 
will have the highest percent decrease as the pair is furthest apart.  
 To investigate how trade reacts to the increase in oil price, it is important to first 
consider 𝛽𝛽5. 𝛽𝛽5 captures the overall magnitude of the change in trade dispersion due to 
the change in the oil price. In other words, for a given 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 and 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒, a higher 𝛽𝛽5 will imply 
larger overall changes in trade for the different distances.  
Next, it is important to consider 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 and 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒. These by themselves will not 
measure the overall magnitude of the change in trade dispersion but will instead 
capture how important high or low values of the oil price are, and whether longer or 
shorter distances are more important for the changes in trade. In particular, 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 
measures the sensitivity to oil price increases. If 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 = 1, and there is a dollar increase in 
oil price, then trade will decrease by the same percentage regardless of the level of the 
oil price. In other words, the decrease in trade will be the same if oil prices increase 
from 1 to 2 dollars or 100 to 101 dollars. If 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 > 1, then 𝑔𝑔 will be in the numerator of (3) 
and so the change in trade will be more sensitive when oil prices are high. In this case, 
there will be a higher relative decrease in trade when oil prices increase from 100 to 101 
dollars as opposed to from 1 to 2 dollars. If 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 < 1, then 𝑔𝑔 will be in the denominator of 
(3) and so the change in trade will be greater for when oil prices increase from 1 to 2 
dollars. A special case here is when 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 is close to 0, in which case replacing 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔  with 
ln(𝑔𝑔) will give the same result.20 Then trade will respond the same to a percent increase 
in the oil price. In this case, there would be the same trade decrease when oil price 
doubles from 1 to 2 dollars as when it doubles from 100 to 200 dollars.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
goal of this paper is just to measure trade dispersion as given in (3), the “overall” effect of oil prices is 
irrelevant here and will be controlled for by year dummies in the regression.   
20 In accordance with the Box-Cox (1964) transformation:  ln(𝑔𝑔) = lim
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔→0
(𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 1)/𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔. Then for when 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔is 
close to 0, the interaction term becomes  𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 ln(𝑔𝑔) = 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥(𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 1)/𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 = 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔/𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 −
𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥/𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔. As the model will be estimated using country-pair fixed effects (with year dummies) the results 
will remain the same. When ln(𝑔𝑔)is used, the regression will estimate 𝛽𝛽5, and when 𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔  is used, the 
regression will estimate 𝛽𝛽5/𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔. 
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 Analogous to 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔, 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 measures the sensitivity of trade to changes in distance; i.e. 
the rate at which trade decreases due to distance. Here, if 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 = 1, then trade decreases 
by the same additional percent for every unit increase in distance. If 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 > 1, then 𝑥𝑥 is in 
the numerator of (3) implying that the additional percent trade decrease due to 
distance grows as the distance increases. In other words, the decrease in trade becomes 
more negative at an increasing rate with distance. If 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 < 1, then the additional percent 
trade decrease diminishes as distance increases. Here the decrease in trade becomes 
more negative at a decreasing rate with distance. A case to consider is when 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 is close 
to 0, in which case replacing 𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  with ln(𝑥𝑥) will give the same result. Then the 
additional percent trade decrease is constant as distance increases by the percent rather 
than the level. Consider the example with the 4 country-pairs above. Define PCT as 
percent change in trade due to an oil price increase. Then when 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 = 1, (PCT of CP1 – 
PCT of CP2) = (PCT of CP2– PCT of CP3) = (PCT of CP3 – PDT of CP4). When 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 > 1, then 
(PCT of CP1 – PCT of CP2) < (PCT of CP2 – PCT of CP3) < (PCT of CP3 – PCT of CP4). When 
𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 < 1, then (PCT of CP1 – PCT of CP2) > (PCT of CP2 – PCT of CP3) > (PCT of CP3 – PCT 
of CP4).  When 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 is close to 0 then (PCT of CP1 – PCT of CP2) = (PCT of CP2 – PCT of 
CP4). 
2.3.2 Estimation  
 The goal here is to test if an oil price-distance interaction effect does indeed 
exist in the real world, and if so, to provide some measure of its magnitude. Therefore, 
the interaction term 𝛽𝛽5𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  is incorporated in a standard panel gravity regression, 
and all that matters is that condition (4) holds with the estimates so that there will be a 
greater trade decrease (or a lower trade increase) for the longer distance. The 
regression model is:  
(5)   ln�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎� =  𝛽𝛽1 ln𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽2 ln𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ln𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 +
𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽10 ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽11 ln𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎  
where:  
 
15 
 
The observation unit is country pair 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗  for year 𝑎𝑎. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 is the real dollar value of exports 
from country 𝑖𝑖 to country 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑎𝑎. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 are the real GDPs of countries 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗  in 
year 𝑎𝑎. 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the distance between the two countries,  𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 is the oil price in year t, and 
𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  is the interaction variable in question. 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥  is a 1 year lagged interaction 
variable, and is included because the trade outcomes may be formed sometime after an 
oil price increase. The distance measure is based on the geographic coordinates of the 
geographic center of the countries as defined by the CIA World Factbook. The oil price 
measure is the annual average Brent Crude oil price as reported by the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics.  
In the full specification, additional variables are added that might be correlated 
with the interaction 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎, 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎, and 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎. These are dummy variables for whether 
the country-pair in question belongs to the eurozone, any other currency union, and/or 
has a free trade agreement in year 𝑎𝑎. The eurozone is coded separately, as its effect is 
much lower in magnitude than other currency unions. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎,𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 are real GDPs per 
capita; these help control for the countries’ capital intensity and the standard of living.21 
𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 are a vector of dummy variables for each year and are used to control for 
overall (over all country-pairs) trade effects in year 𝑎𝑎; these variables control for the 
effects of all purely year variant variables like 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎. For further details and data sources, 
see appendix A. 
 Eq. (5) is estimated by a country-pair fixed effects regression. The fixed effects 
regression controls for all time invariant pair-specific variables such as distance, culture, 
common language, common border, etc. In this type of model the overall baseline trade 
for each country pair is controlled for, and what the regression ultimately looks at is 
how trade changes over the years within country pairs. For the full specification all 
world countries are used for years 1952-2012. The presence of 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 and 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 produces a 
nonlinear model; one possibility for estimation is to use nonlinear least squares (NLLS). 
                                                          
21 GDP/capita or population was incorporated in early theoretical gravity papers – see Anderson (1979) 
and Bergstrand (1989).  
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However, this is not feasible as there are thousands of country-pairs and demeaning is 
not possible. This study considers another approach; 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 and 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 can be chosen by the 
researcher so that the model becomes linear and then a simple OLS fixed effects could 
be run. OLS will minimize the sum of squared residuals given the values for 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒. In 
this paper, different combinations of 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 are manually chosen until one 
combination (jointly with all the other beta estimates) produces the lowest possible sum 
of squared residuals. With this procedure, OLS tests to see if the best possible fit for the 
interaction variable is significant and provides a magnitude of its impact. Further, as the 
goal of NLLS is to minimize the SSR, this will produce the same coefficient estimates as 
running NLLS.22  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Specifications 
 The results from the panel gravity regression are shown in Table 2.1. All 
specifications include year dummies. Specification 1 is a baseline traditional gravity 
equation that includes distance and incomes without country pair fixed effects. 
Specification 2 is a baseline fixed effects gravity regression; here distance is dropped as 
it is time invariant. Specification 3 includes the interaction term in question. 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔� and 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒� 
are chosen within .05 accuracy, and are reported at the top. Here 𝛽𝛽5� = -2.091 and is 
highly significant, indicating that there is indeed an interaction effect. 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔� and 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒� are 
both negative, however condition (4) holds with the estimates, meaning that an 
increase in the oil price will produce a smaller/more negative trade effect for longer 
distances. The rest of the specifications also reveal that interaction term is with the 
correct sign and significance. The magnitude interpretation of these coefficients will be 
discussed in the next subsection. Specification 4 includes all the variables from the full 
model in eq. (5) without the lagged interaction. Note that the eurozone dummy is 
negative and insignificant – more on this in section 2.6. Specification 5 has a lagged 
interaction added and is considered to be the model in eq. (5). Here the lagged 
                                                          
22 This is confirmed with a small sample. 
 
17 
 
interaction has a coefficient of lower magnitude and significance than that of the 
contemporaneous.     
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, after rising sharply in the 1970s and falling in the 
1980s, oil prices have substantially increased in the 2000s. As a robustness check, 
regressions 6 and 7 split the data at 1992 - each including the full model. 1992 is chosen 
because that is the period when the world became more open to trade due political 
changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 It is known that this type of regression suffers from the many zeros problem in 
trade. 45% of the observations have 0 trade, and thus drop when the log is taken. As a 
fix, the final specification runs the regression with pairwise combinations of 60 large 
trading countries for all years. The countries used are summarized in Appendix B. In this 
sample only 10% of the observations have 0 trade. Further, the selected sample only 
makes up 11% of all observations, but constitutes over 75% of the traded value. 
2.4.2 Robustness 
 For further robustness checks, different measures for the oil price and distance 
are used with all the specifications from Table 2.1. These measures for oil are the Brent 
Crude, West Texas Intermediate, and Dubai Fateh, which in Figure 2.1 all appear to be 
highly similar in their annual averages. A second distance measure, a measure from the 
capitals of the countries, is also included. This is also calculated from coordinates of the 
capitals, provided by the CIA World Factbook. The results show that any combination 
between a distance measure and an oil price measure leads to specification results 
highly similar to Table 2.1. Further, instead of 1992, different year splits are used from 
the 80s and 90s with combinations of the different distance and oil price measures. The 
results are again significant everywhere and are of similar magnitude to the year splits 
of Table 2.1. 
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2.4.3 Meaning of Coefficients 
 Table 2.1 and the robustness checks conclude that an increase in the oil price will 
relatively decrease trade by more for longer distances. With the estimates obtained, 
one can easily obtain magnitudes of the decrease. First, consider an oil price change 
from 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1 to 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎. Then define ∆𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖� = 𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖� − 𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎−1
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 � to be the percent change 
in trade for a country pair with distance 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  between periods 𝑎𝑎 − 1 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎.  Then consider 
two country pairs with distances: {𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2}. As a measure of how trade changes relative to 
the different distances one can use the difference between the two trade changes. In 
this case, consider Eq. (1) and define 𝐷𝐷 to be a measure of a change in trade dispersion: 
𝐷𝐷 = ∆𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒2� − ∆𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒1� = 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥2
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 � − 𝛽𝛽5𝑥𝑥1
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 �
= 𝛽𝛽5(𝑥𝑥2
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥1
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥)�𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 � 
If there is an oil price increase, and 𝑥𝑥2 > 𝑥𝑥1, then D should be negative and trade 
becomes more localized. In this case when getting rid of the logs, the actual relative 
percent decrease in trade can be obtained by 100 ∗ �1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥2 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1
𝑥𝑥2�
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑥𝑥1 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1
𝑥𝑥1�
� = 100 ∗ (1 −
𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷).  On the other hand, if there is a decrease in the oil price, then the more distant 
country pair should increase trade by more (implying a positive 𝐷𝐷) and trade becomes 
more dispersed. 
Specifications (5) through (8) in Table 2.1 also include a lagged oil interaction 
term. This implies that a permanent increase in the oil price will fully impact trade after 
two years. The full impact on trade is  𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖� − 𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎−2
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 �.  Then for this case: 
∆𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒2� − ∆𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒1� =  (𝑥𝑥2
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥1
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥)(𝛽𝛽5�𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−2
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 � + 𝛽𝛽6�𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−3
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 �) 
Now assume that in periods 𝑎𝑎 − 2 and 𝑎𝑎 − 3 oil prices are the same, and then there is 
permanent increase in oil price starting in 𝑎𝑎 − 1. Then the above can be simplified: 
𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−2
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−3
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 , and 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔, and simply adding 𝛽𝛽5 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛽𝛽6 will give the full impact 
after 2 years. 
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 Given the estimates from Table 2.1, a way to interpret the coefficients on the 
interaction is to look at how predicted trade changes when the distance is some x miles 
relative to when the distance is 0 miles (this can be given by the measure 𝐷𝐷). The 
problem is that 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒� is negative for many specifications, and so one cannot divide by a 
distance of 0 as this implies an infinitely larger decrease in trade when compared to any 
other distance. The shortest distance in the sample is 46 miles from St. Lucia to St. 
Vincent, and there are a total of 12 country pairs with a distance less than 100 miles. 
Therefore, a reasonable baseline of 100 miles will be used to compare how trade 
changes for the different distances. The units for distance are 1 for 10,00023 miles. The 
units of oil price are in dollars per barrel (in 2005 dollars) as given in Figure 2.1. Then for 
the change in the oil price, assume that the oil price decreases by half from its sample 
mean. In this case the means for the full sample, after 1991 and before 1992, are 30, 40, 
and 24 dollars per barrel, respectively. Table 2.2 shows how trade decreases at different 
distances for the different specifications in Table 2.1. For example, for specification 4, 
assume an oil price decrease from 30 dollars to 15 dollars a barrel. Then, the column 
shows the different measures of 𝐷𝐷 (in percent changes) for different distances relative 
to the 100 mile baseline. For a distance of 1000 miles: 𝐷𝐷 = −1.389(. 1−.3 −
. 01−.3)(15−.25 − 30−.25) = .223 and the percent change is then: 100 ∗ (𝑣𝑣 .223 − 1) =
24.98. Specifications 3 and 4 only show the 1 period effect, as no lags are included. 
Specifications 5-8 include a lag and the effect shown is the full two year effect on trade. 
For these specifications assume that 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−2
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−3
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 , and 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔  so that adding the 
𝛽𝛽5 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛽𝛽6 will give the full impact. 
 The overall impression of Table 2.2 is that oil prices do indeed alter the behavior 
of trade with substantial effects. Based on the regressions, the magnitudes appear to be 
significant and large. For example, in the full specification an oil price halving will make 
trade more dispersed by increasing trade around 40% for a distance of 10,000 miles and 
by 25% for a distance of 1000 miles (relative to the 100 miles baseline). Further, almost 
all regressions show that 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒� < 0, suggesting that there would not be much of a 
                                                          
23 So .01 represents 100 miles (the baseline). 
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difference in the change in trade for very long distances. Perhaps this is because cargo 
usually travels mostly by ship for long distances and by truck or rail for shorter 
distances. Cargo transportation (that is not by air) is much cheaper across water by ship 
than by land with a truck – see Gilbert and Perl (2013). A rise in oil prices will thus affect 
shipping by land much more and this will contribute to the largest increase in the price.   
 Table 2.3 shows the impact of historic oil price movements. The first is the 
drastic increase during 1970s, while the second is the decrease that followed in the 
1980s; both use the estimates before 1992 (specification 7). The third is the recent oil 
price increase in the 2000s and uses the estimates after 1992 (specification 6). Based on 
this information, it appears that the drastic oil price increase since 2000 has had 
substantial effects in that world trade has become significantly more localized, implying 
a 35% relative trade decrease for 1000 miles, and a 50% decrease for 10,000 miles. 
2.5 The General Equilibrium (GE) Gravity Model 
2.5.1 The Model 
 This section will incorporate the interaction term into a more modern version of 
the gravity model. In this version, the gravity model takes into account general 
equilibrium effects, such as trade diversion. This result has theoretical foundations in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).24 The paper uses the AvW general equilibrium 
model which produces the following gravity equation: 
(6)       𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤
�
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
�
1−𝜎𝜎
∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗    𝜎𝜎 > 1 
       where:   
(7)      P𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 = ��
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
P𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
�     ∀𝑗𝑗 
                                                          
24 Also see Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985,1989), and Deardorff (1998) for similar derivations.  
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 In this model, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 again represents the value of exports from country i to country 
j, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 represent the GDPs of  𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗.  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are the trade costs between 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗. 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 is world 
GDP, and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 is country i’s world GDP share. 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are known as the multilateral 
resistances (MRs) of countries 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. These are what make GE gravity equation 
different from the traditional gravity equation. Both 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are country specific and 
depend on the trade costs and GDPs. They represent the overall trade costs associated 
with the particular country, and so as 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 increases 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 also increase.  From eq. (7), the 
MRs can be solved for given values of GDPs, trade costs, sigma and a computational 
program. A summary of the model and its theoretical predictions regarding the impact 
of oil price is available in Appendix C.  
2.5.2 Estimation 
The GE gravity model in (6) can be applied to panel data and estimated. The 
additional variables implied by GE gravity are the MRs - ln(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎) 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 ln�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎�.  Not 
including the MRs in the regression will bias the coefficient on trade costs upward. In 
other words, the coefficient estimates should really be more negative. This is because 
trade costs are positively correlated with MRs, and MRs are positively related to trade25. 
However, in its application the MRs cannot be easily solved for. Therefore, country-year 
specific dummy variables are used to control for the MRs and any other country specific 
factors. In particular, each dummy is equal to 1 for the particular year and the particular 
country, 0 otherwise. Because some countries are not included for certain years, the 
number of dummies is only roughly equal to the number of countries times the number 
of years. The dummies also control for all year specific effects. The full model thus 
becomes: 
(8)   ln�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎� =  𝛽𝛽1𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 +
𝛽𝛽′𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 − 𝑌𝑌𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎   
                                                          
25 Mathematically if the variable ln (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎) is not included in the regression then the sign of bias on the 
coefficient of trade costs = 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(ln�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎� , (𝜎𝜎 − 1) ln(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎))>0.  
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(8) is somewhat difficult to estimate with the full country sample. The dataset contains 
over 200 countries and 60 years. Having to add this many dummy variables will easily 
amount to over 80GB of data and possibly require days of computation for a single 
regression. To simplify computations, only the sample of selected countries in Appendix 
B is used.      
 Table 2.4 reports estimates of (8) using a panel fixed effects regression. The first 
regression is (8) with the contemporaneous interaction term. The second is the full 
specification and includes both the contemporaneous and lagged interaction terms. The 
third is again the full specification, but uses the alternative distance measure from 
capital to capital. The fourth specification is more general in that it includes importer-
year and exporter-year dummy variables. For each year, each country has a dummy for 
when it is an exporter, and a separate dummy when it is an importer. This is done 
because the assumption that trade costs are symmetric may not hold. In this case the 
model becomes equation (7c) from Appendix C, and for each year, the importer and 
exporter dummies are controlling for 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎,Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎  ,𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎  Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎.   
Overall the results are consistent with theory in that condition (4) holds with the 
estimates and the coefficient in-front of the interaction term is highly significant. 
Including the country-dummies helps remove the omitted variable bias. However, 
although the coefficients are not biased, they no longer represent the impact on trade. 
If the impact gives information as to how trade changes when trade costs change (all 
else constant), it is important to remember that the MRs are also functions of the trade 
costs. For example, consider the log of Eq. (6) and the derivative with respect to trade 
costs: 
(9)        
dln𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= (1 − 𝜎𝜎) �1 −
dln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−
dln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� 
If impact is defined as 
dln𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 , then clearly this depends on how the MRs change in 
response to the trade costs. Therefore, 
dln𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 will vary by country-pair. It is known that if 
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dln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 and dln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
dln 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
> 0, then the impact of trade costs is not as negative as represented by 
the coefficient (1 − 𝜎𝜎) alone. In summary, not controlling for the MRs will bias the 
coefficient upwards; however when they are controlled for, the impact should really be 
less negative than represented by the coefficient estimate.  
2.5.3 The GE Impact Of Oil Prices 
The GE gravity model predicts that total world trade will stay the same when 
trade costs change and there is only a trade redistribution effect. For example, as oil 
prices decrease, world trade becomes more dispersed, internal trade (consumption of 
own good) decreases, and world international trade increases.  
 It is somewhat difficult to obtain the actual impact of oil prices on trade based 
on the coefficient estimates. Oil price will change relative trade costs for the whole 
world and it is therefore essential to account for worldwide MR changes. Glick and 
Taylor (2010) propose to first obtain the coefficient estimates using a regression, and 
then to apply the estimates directly to the GE gravity equation in (6) using a 3 step 
procedure. Step 1 is to use (6) to solve for the trade costs (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎) and MR terms 
(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎) using given data on export levels (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  and GDPs (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖). There is a slight 
problem here in that there are more unknowns than equations. To solve this problem, 
Glick and Taylor (2010) set all internal trade costs (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎) equal to 1. Then the MRs26 
can easily be solved from the internal trade equations (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) in (6), and then the rest of 
the trade costs (the international trade costs) can be solved from the rest of the trade 
equations. Step 2 is the implementation of a policy27 that changes the trade costs, and 
the recalculation of the MRs using (7). In step 3, (6) is used to obtain the counterfactual 
export levels given the new trade costs, MRs, and the same GDPs. The ratio of the actual 
to the counterfactual export level is then used to calculate the impact of the policy. An 
                                                          
26 For this process, solving for MRs and the other variables refers to solving for them raised to the 1 − 𝜎𝜎. 
Therefore, no assumptions on 𝜎𝜎 are made. 
27 Policy means anything that alters the trade cost structure. In this paper it is the oil price-distance 
interaction term. In particular, what is considered is how the trade costs will respond when oil prices 
decrease by half. Later in the paper, the Eurozone will be examined and the policy will be a hypothetical 
removal of the Eurozone, which will increase the trade costs within the countries of the Eurozone. 
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ostensible problem is that step 1 assumes 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is set to 1. However, Appendix D shows 
that it does not matter what the internal trade costs are set to; in the end the 
counterfactual export level will be the same.  
 For the calculation of the impact, it is necessary to know the state of the world – 
in terms of GDPs and trade levels. In this case the thought experiment is to see how a 
halving of the oil price at 2012 (last year of sample) will increase exports. The countries 
used are the selected country sample in Appendix B. In 2011 and 2012 the oil price was 
roughly $92. The interest is in the full two year impact when oil price halves to $46 
dollars. (6) predicts that 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. To be consistent with the model, instead of using 
export levels, the averaged trade is used, calculated from the data as 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 =
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2
 ∀ 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 . Then in implementing the steps 1-3: GDPs and the averaged trade levels 
are known for all countries in 2012, while internal trade is calculated as:  
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 −�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
 𝑖𝑖 
𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 
     ∀𝑖𝑖 
Further, as step 1 suggests, the trade costs are calculated from the trade levels and 
GDPs. Step 2 requires estimates of the parameters. For the estimates, it is important to 
have a recent sample to capture the oil price increase since 2000 along with country 
specific dummies so that the estimates are the most consistent with the model. Here 
the estimates come from Table 2.7, specification 6, which reports results for (8) after 
1992. The trade costs can be seen as having the following structure: 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 ∗
𝑣𝑣𝛽𝛽1𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥+𝛽𝛽2𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥
.  Where 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 represents any other trade costs not related to oil 
prices, and 𝑣𝑣𝛽𝛽1𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥+𝛽𝛽2𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥
 are the oil price interaction components in (8). Next, 
applying the estimates ⇒ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖20121−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012 ∗ 𝑣𝑣−.2321∗92
−.1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−.7
. Now after a 
hypothetical decrease in the oil prices (all else constant) the trade costs become 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012 ∗ 𝑣𝑣−.2321∗46
−.1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−.7
= 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖20121−𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝑣𝑣−.2321∗(46
−.1−92−.1)𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−.7
. In this 
case the 2012 trade costs (as computed in step 1) are multiplied by 
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𝑣𝑣−.2321∗(46
−.1−92−.1)𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−.7
 to form the after policy trade costs. This multiplication requires 
knowledge of internal distances (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) for the computation of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎. For simplicity, 
these are calculated as just the square-root of the total country area. Once the after 
policy trade costs are obtained, (7) is used to recalculate the MRs using MATLAB. Finally 
in step 3, the counterfactual trade levels are obtained using (6) with the new MRs and 
trade costs.  
2.5.4 GE Impact Results 
For each country-pair the actual averaged trade levels28 are compared to the 
counterfactual averaged trade levels. Then the percentage change in trade for each 
country pair is calculated as 100 ∗ (
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎 − 1). Table 2.5 shows the percent 
change in trade for the top 15 trading nations. The decrease in internal trade is then 
given on the diagonals. The overall percentage change in international trade for each 
country is available at the end of each column, and is calculated from the ratio of total 
counterfactual international trade to the total actual international trade for each 
country (from all other 56 countries). From the table, it appears that the largest 
increases will be in the UK, Canada, Japan, and South Korea. This is consistent with 
theory in that these countries tend to be isolated, and so they will have the largest 
reductions in the trade costs with the other countries. Then the overall world 
international trade increase is calculated from the ratio of total counterfactual trade to 
the total actual international trade from all countries. It appears that the overall world 
trade will increase by roughly 3%. The magnitudes do appear less than most 
specifications in Table 2.2, but here only the selected country sample is used. The 
selected country sample in the traditional gravity regressions (specification 8) also 
produced lower magnitudes. 
                                                          
28 Actual trade levels refer to the 2012 trade levels before the hypothetical oil price decrease. The 
counterfactual trade levels refer to the trade levels after the hypothetical oil price decrease. 
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2.6 Application: The Eurozone Effect on Trade 
 Adding an oil price-distance interaction term in the gravity model might have 
many applications. One application is a more accurate estimate of the eurozone effect 
on trade (within countries of the eurozone). As shown above, there is clear evidence 
that oil prices cause changes in trade dispersion. The conclusion is that in times of 
increasing oil prices, countries will increase trade more with their neighbors relative to 
countries further away; in other words, trade will become more localized. Because the 
EMU creation corresponded with the major oil price increase since 1999 and the 
countries of the EMU tend to be closer together, the interaction can partially explain 
why trade increased more in the EMU compared to country pairs not in the EMU. 
Hence, this implies that the true eurozone effect should be less than originally 
estimated. 
2.6.1 Literature Review 
The eurozone effect on trade falls under the umbrella of estimations used to 
estimate the effects of currency unions on trade. Theoretically, currency unions help 
increase trade as they eliminate currency exchange costs and exchange rate risk while 
providing greater price transparency. The widely-cited paper of Rose (2000) estimates 
the currency union effect on trade from all possible worldwide currency unions. To do 
this, Rose adds a currency union dummy variable to a cross-sectional gravity regression. 
The variable is equal to 1 if the country-pair belongs in a currency union and 0 
otherwise. The coefficient in-front of the dummy variable suggests that countries in 
currency unions trade as much as three times with each other than country pairs not in 
currency unions – this is known as the Rose effect. However, cross-sectional regressions 
are generally weaker than panel fixed effects regressions in that the latter control for all 
time invariant country pair unobservables. In this case the panel fixed effects regression 
looks at the effect of when countries enter and leave a currency union.  In a follow up 
paper Glick and Rose (2002), Rose acknowledges that because he had a cross section 
gravity model he was answering the question: “How much more do countries within 
currency unions trade than non-members?” when the more appropriate question to 
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answer: “What is the trade effect of a country joining (or leaving) a currency union?” is 
answered using a panel fixed effects model.   
One of the first papers to explore the eurozone effect on trade is Micco, Stein, 
and Ordenez (MSO, 2003). As in Glick and Rose (2002), MSO also use a panel fixed 
effects gravity regression (with year dummies) for years 1992-2002, but with a eurozone 
dummy variable instead. MSO use 22 countries - half are members of the eurozone and 
half are industrialized countries outside the eurozone. For this particular estimation, the 
coefficient on the eurozone dummy behaves like a difference in differences estimate. It 
more or less compares the change in trade of the eurozone countries before and after 
1999 to that of the other industrialized countries before and after 1999. After 
controlling for certain key variables, the coefficient estimate of the eurozone dummy 
suggests that the country-pairs in the eurozone had their bilateral trade increase 5-10% 
more compared to country-pairs not in the eurozone. 
 A more recent paper Frankel (2010), expands the dataset used by MSO (2003) 
for years 1992-2006 and runs the same panel gravity model. He obtains slightly higher 
results in that the effect of the EMU on trade is roughly 10%. However, Frankel expands 
the dataset once more to include all world countries between 1945-2006. The results 
then show that the coefficient on EMU is roughly .9. This is similar in magnitude to the 
effect estimated by Rose (2000); however, using such a large sample may contain many 
time varying unobservables, and also compares the eurozone countries to many third 
world combinations. For example, it is known in the trade literature that over the past 
50 years, trade patterns have changed from mainly North-South to North-North trade. 
 Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) also use the methodology of MSO (2003), however 
they apply the AvW - GE gravity model and include country-year dummies to control for 
the multilateral resistance terms. After the dummies are included, the coefficient turns 
significantly negative. Perhaps a weakness of their paper is that only the sample of 
industrialized countries is used. This might not be fully appropriate as the theoretical 
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results of the AvW model require all trading partners. Thus, using only the industrialized 
countries will not fully control for the multilateral resistance terms.   
 Other papers that estimate the EMU impact use less traditional approaches. 
Berger and Niche (2008) uses long run data to study the effect of the Euro currency on 
trade. Once a time trend on trade for the EMU 11 is used, the EMU impact is 
insignificant. Bun and Klaassen (2007) allow for country-pair specific time trends that 
also produce insignificant results. Flam and Nordstram (2006) use bilateral exports as 
their dependent variable of choice. The exports are also broken down by sector to show 
which sectors benefited the most from the trade. Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) use a 
dynamic first differenced gravity model. The main results obtained from all papers are 
summarized in Table 2.6. 
2.6.2 Traditional Gravity Estimation and Results  
The eurozone effect on trade in this research is estimated using the traditional 
gravity methodology of the above papers. In particular, to be consistent with the 
literature, eq. (5) is estimated by panel fixed effects using only the industrialized 
countries, years 1992-2012, and an additional (country specific) real effective exchange 
rate variable. The panel fixed effects estimation with year dummies compares how 
trade changes in the countries of the eurozone to how trade changes in the countries 
outside the eurozone before and after 1999 (except for country-pairs that include 
Greece). Including recent years (since 1992) is important, as the EMU estimate is more 
or less a difference in differences estimate. For a fair comparison, only the industrialized 
countries from Appendix B are included. If, for example, all the countries of the 
European Union are included, the coefficient on the EMU dummy is significantly 
negative. This is because trade with Eastern Europe has drastically increased since 1999. 
Likewise, trade with many less developed nations has also drastically increased since 
1999. If all world countries were included, specification 6 from Table 2.1 suggests that 
the eurozone decreased trade by more than 10%.  
 
29 
 
Table 2.7 shows the eurozone effect before and after including the oil price 
interaction variable. Specifications 1-4 are the traditional estimations and include the 
industrialized countries only. Specification 1 does not take into account oil prices and 
suggests that the eurozone effect is  (𝑣𝑣 .0941 − 1) ∗ 100 = 9.87%. After the oil-price 
interaction term is included, specification 2 suggests that the eurozone effect falls to 
6.82%. Specification 3 uses the alternative distance measure, and 4 includes a lagged 
interaction term. Their estimates also imply a eurozone effect of around 7%. 
2.6.3 GE Gravity Estimation and Results  
The AvW – GE gravity model may also be applied in estimating the eurozone 
effect on trade. The theoretical model requires all trading partners; therefore using just 
the industrialized countries is not fully appropriate for this estimation, as this will not 
fully control for the MRs.29 However as stated above, the problem with including all 
countries is that since 1999 trade increased by a larger factor with many less developed 
countries, and therefore caused the eurozone effect to turn negative. The good news 
with this estimation is that it uses country-year dummies. Besides controlling for the 
multilateral resistance terms, they also control for country specific trade changes over 
time. When less developed countries are included, the dummies are able to control for 
their drastic trade increase with the rest of the world, thus allowing for a fair 
comparison. Therefore, the sample for this estimation is all the countries of Appendix B. 
To estimate the EMU coefficient, variations of (8) after 1992 are used. The 
results are reported in Table 2.7, specifications 5-8. To control for the multilateral 
resistance terms (and country specific trade increases), specifications 5 and 6 include 
country-year dummy variables. The coefficient estimates without the interaction term 
are reported in specification 5, while the estimates with the interaction term are 
reported in specification 6. When trade cost symmetry is not assumed, the model 
requires exporter-year and importer-year dummies to control for the multilateral 
                                                          
29 When only the industrialized countries are included with country-year dummies, the coefficient on EMU 
is very close to 0 and insignificant. Baldwin and Taglioni(2007) even have a significantly negative 
coefficient.  
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resistance terms. The results using these controls are reported in specifications 7 and 8. 
The coefficient estimates are roughly similar across the four specifications. As can be 
seen, the eurozone coefficient drops by approximately a third once the oil-price 
interaction is included.  
These coefficient estimates only show how the trade costs change, but not the 
full trade impact. To my knowledge, no other study has shown the full trade impact 
based on the AvW model. The impact should actually be lower than 7% because the 
addition of the eurozone will decrease trade costs which will in-turn lead to a decrease 
in the MR terms for the eurozone members. To obtain the actual impact of the 
eurozone on trade, the three step procedure from section 2.5 is used. The thought 
experiment is to see how trade changes when the eurozone no longer exists. To be most 
consistent with the model, the estimate from specification 6 is used. From step 1, the 
same 2012 trade costs as section 2.5 are calculated from the trade levels and GDPs. In 
step 2, the calculated trade costs from step 1 can be seen as having the following 
structure:  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑣𝑣𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ⟹ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖20121−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012 ∗ 𝑣𝑣 .0703∗𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012 . 
Where 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012 are all the other trade costs not including the benefits from the 
eurozone. Then clearly these other trade costs are the new trade costs when the 
eurozone no longer exists ⟹ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖20121−𝜎𝜎/𝑣𝑣 .0703∗𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2012. 
Once the new trade costs are obtained, (7) is used to recalculate the new MR terms. 
Once the new MR terms are obtained, (6) is used to obtain the counterfactual trade 
level. For each country pair the ratio of the counterfactual to the actual trade is used to 
calculate the impact of the eurozone for the specific country pair. Table 2.8 summarizes 
how trade will decrease between the eurozone members once the benefit from the 
eurozone is removed. The end of the columns report how each country will lose from 
the removal of the eurozone; this is calculated from the ratio of counterfactual to actual 
trade for each country with only all the other eurozone members. As can be seen, for 
most members the loss in trade is around 5%. Finally, for what can perhaps be called the 
eurozone effect from the GE model, the last number gives information of how the total 
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trade from the eurozone changes; this is calculated from the ratio of counterfactual to 
actual total trade from only all the eurozone members. This value is again around 5%. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This study incorporates an oil price-distance interaction variable in a large panel 
gravity regression to show that oil prices cause changes in global trade dispersion. In 
other words when oil prices rise, trade becomes more localized, and when they fall, 
trade becomes more dispersed. According to Table 2.3, the magnitudes are reasonably 
large in that the oil price increase in the 1970s relatively reduced trade by 10% for 
countries 1000 miles apart, and 30% for countries 10,000 miles apart. On the other 
hand, the increase since the late 1990s has led to an even more substantial localization 
in the order of a 35% relative decrease for 1000 miles, and a 50% decrease for 10,000 
miles. Based on this information, in times of decreasing oil prices, the more isolated 
countries benefit more (in terms of international trade increases), but are relatively 
worse off in times of increasing oil prices as their trade decreases the most. These are all 
big picture results; some basic extensions may include: splitting goods into product 
categories based on weight to value ratio, or perhaps controlling for mode of 
transportation as shipping is much more fuel intensive by air than by water (Gilbert and 
Perl, 2013, Table 4.15).   
The results presented here can in turn shed more light on the characterization of 
trade costs, and in particular their time varying component. The application in this paper 
concludes that the oil price-distance interaction reduces the eurozone effect on trade by 
roughly a third, and up to a half when calculating the general equilibrium impact. In 
recent years the existence of the eurozone has come into question. The eurozone did 
increase trade, but not to the extent previously thought. Perhaps this paper provides 
more reason to doubt the benefits of the currency union. 
In current times, crude oil continues to be a driving force behind world 
transportation. According to IEA (2012) – World Energy Outlook, petroleum will still be 
the driving force by 2035, supplying 87% of the world’s energy transportation needs. 
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Further, oil has an expected demand growth by roughly 1% per year, but conventional 
world oil production is expected to remain roughly constant through the year 2035. 
Given these circumstances, an increased price and volatility of crude oil is highly likely in 
the future (Hamilton, 2008, Owen et al., 2010), and therefore the results from this study 
will remain important.  
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 Table 2.1 Traditional Gravity Estimates (1952-2012) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Alpha Coefficients standard fixed effects interaction full  
lagged 
interaction year>1991 year<1992 
selected all 
years 
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈     -0.25 -0.25 -0.2 -0.95 -0.2 -1.2 
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙 
  
-0.25 -0.3 -0.3 -0.25 0.45 0.35 
Beta Coefficients 
        𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙  
  
-2.091*** -1.389*** -1.182*** -4.997*** 1.996*** 15.67*** 
  
(-10.93) (-9.699) (-7.153) (-6.602) (4.495) (6.803) 
𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙  
    
-0.298* -2.545*** 0.505 -6.103** 
    
(-1.810) (-3.900) (1.106) (-2.502) 
GDP 1 1.018*** 0.266*** 0.266*** -0.207*** -0.199*** 0.224*** -0.713*** 0.209** 
 
(138.6) (21.48) (21.55) (-4.356) (-4.180) (3.000) (-9.941) (2.182) 
GDP 2 0.819*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.707*** 0.715*** 1.041*** 0.288*** 0.816*** 
 
(118.4) (18.84) (18.92) (16.76) (16.92) (17.11) (4.587) (10.36) 
GDP/Capita 1 
   
0.471*** 0.467*** 0.164** 0.823*** 0.0878 
    
(10.43) (10.32) (2.235) (11.68) (0.968) 
GDP/Capita 2 
   
-0.495*** -0.501*** -0.607*** -0.157** -0.491*** 
    
(-12.08) (-12.19) (-9.770) (-2.546) (-6.909) 
CU 
   
0.816*** 0.808*** -0.0887 0.783*** 1.027*** 
    
(7.968) (7.888) (-0.167) (8.815) (4.191) 
EMU 
   
-0.00694 -0.00635 -0.102*** 
 
-0.195*** 
    
(-0.147) (-0.135) (-3.526) 
 
(-3.448) 
FTA 
   
0.469*** 0.463*** 0.193*** 0.573*** 0.156*** 
    
(9.993) (9.925) (4.431) (7.673) (3.010) 
Distance -1.277*** 
       
 
(-85.58) 
       Country-pair Fixed 
Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 669,429 669,429 669,429 669,429 668,075 395,000 273,075 135,114 
Year dummies included in all,  Cluster-robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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            Table 2.2 Meaning of Coefficients  
 
Table 1 Specification 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Full Interaction 
Oil price change ($) 
−𝟐𝟐.𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−.𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 
30 to 15 
−𝟏𝟏.𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟎𝟎𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−.𝟑𝟑 
30 to 15 
 
−𝟏𝟏.𝟒𝟒𝟑𝟑𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−.𝟑𝟑 
30 to 15 
−𝟕𝟕.𝟐𝟐𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−.𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 
40 to 20 
𝟐𝟐.𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊.𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐 
24 to 12 
𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐𝟓𝟓𝟕𝟕𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏.𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊.𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟐 
30 to 15 
With Lag No No Yes yes yes yes 
Distance (miles) Percent increase in predicted trade when oil price is halved (relative to 100 miles benchmark) 
200 8.88 8.76 8.69 11.22 0.91 1.10 
400 16.95 16.43 16.30 21.62 2.17 2.53 
600 21.29 20.43 20.26 27.28 3.12 3.55 
800 24.20 23.06 22.87 31.11 3.92 4.37 
1000 26.36 24.98 24.78 33.97 4.61 5.07 
2000 32.55 30.35 30.10 42.22 7.32 7.69 
4000 37.99 34.88 34.58 49.55 11.14 11.11 
6000 40.85 37.19 36.87 53.43 14.08 13.60 
10000 44.13 39.76 39.42 57.91 18.79 17.39 
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                  Table 2.3 Impact of Historic Oil Price Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Full Interaction 𝟐𝟐.𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊.𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐 𝟐𝟐.𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊.𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐 −𝟕𝟕.𝟐𝟐𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−.𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−.𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 
Historic period 1973-1980 1980-1986 1999-2008 
Real oil price change $12 to $77 $77 to $23 $21 to $90 
Distance (miles) Percent change in predicted trade (relative to 100 miles benchmark) 
200 -2.15 1.33 -14.58 
400 -5.02 3.18 -25.18 
600 -7.11 4.58 -30.07 
800 -8.80 5.75 -33.07 
1000 -10.25 6.79 -35.18 
2000 -15.59 10.84 -40.68 
4000 -22.38 16.62 -44.94 
6000 -27.09 21.14 -46.99 
10000 -33.83 28.49 -49.20 
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                  Table 2.4 General Equilibrium Gravity Model Estimation (1952-2012) 
  1 2 3 4 
Alpha Coefficients Baseline Lagged Interaction Alternative Distance 
Exporter/Importer 
Dummies 
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈 -1.05 -1 -1 -1 
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.15 
Beta Coefficients 
    𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙  
-20.08*** -13.02*** -12.71*** -7.483*** 
(-6.480) (-4.227) (-4.258) (-4.117) 
𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙  
 
-5.326* -5.493* -3.681** 
 
(-1.801) (-1.885) (-2.150) 
CU 0.775*** 0.755*** 0.766*** 0.804*** 
 
(3.381) (3.293) (3.303) (3.739) 
EMU 0.0581 0.0608 0.0709 0.0639 
 
(0.919) (0.968) (1.128) (1.103) 
FTA 0.435*** 0.430*** 0.426*** 0.425*** 
 
(9.075) (9.016) (8.912) (9.941) 
Country-Year Dummies Yes  Yes Yes No 
Observations 158,658 156,959 156,959 156,959 
Country-pair fixed effects in all  
Cluster-robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5 GE Gravity Model Percent Change In Trade (due to oil price halving from 92 to 46 for top 15 trading countries)                                                                                                                             
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Ch
in
a 
United States -0.3 
              United Kingdom 5.3 -1.1 
             France 3.8 1.8 -0.6 
            Germany 4.7 1.9 -0.1 -0.9 
           Italy 5.1 5.6 1.3 2.3 -1.1 
          Netherlands 7.6 1.7 2.8 -5.5 6.3 -7.1 
         Canada -0.9 4.9 3.6 4.4 4.8 7.2 -0.2 
        Japan 5.0 9.2 7.7 8.5 8.8 11.4 4.8 -0.7 
       Spain 4.1 4.5 -0.2 3.8 3.7 6.6 3.8 8.0 -0.9 
      Hong Kong 2.9 6.8 5.3 6.0 6.3 9.0 2.8 3.9 5.6 -52.8 
     India 2.5 6.0 4.4 5.2 5.3 8.1 2.3 5.0 4.7 1.9 -0.7 
    South Korea 6.4 10.5 9.0 9.8 10.1 12.8 6.2 3.3 9.3 4.4 6.1 -4.3 
   Singapore 0.5 4.3 2.8 3.5 3.8 6.4 0.4 2.6 3.0 -1.1 -0.8 3.7 -61.0 
  Russia 1.0 4.5 3.0 3.7 4.1 6.5 0.7 3.0 3.4 1.0 0.7 4.0 -0.8 -0.6 
 China 1.6 5.3 3.8 4.6 4.8 7.4 1.4 2.8 4.1 -1.1 0.3 3.1 -1.4 -1.1 -0.5 
Country percent 
change 2.4 4.2 2.2 1.8 4.2 2.3 0.5 5.2 3.6 1.1 3.4 5.9 0.1 3.0 2.1 
World percent 
Change 3.01 
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         Table 2.6 Eurozone Trade Effect 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Papers 
Estimated trade effect 
of EMU Sample Years 
MSO(2003) 5%-10% 22 developed countries 1992-2002 
Berger and Niche(2005) 15%-40%, insignificant 22 developed countries 1948-2003 
Flam and 
Nordstram(2006) 7.5% - 15% 22 developed countries 1989-2002 
Nardis and 
Vicarelli(2003) 9% 30 countries 1980-2000 
Frankel(2010) 
Frankel(2010) 
Bun & Klaassen(2007)     
Baldwin & Taglioni(2007)   
Baldwin & Taglioni(2007) 
Baldwin & Taglioni(2007) 
10% - 15% 
200% 
2% insignificant 
-10%  
-2% insignificant 
10% (traditonal) 
22 developed countries 
Whole world 
20 developed countries 
22 developed countries 
22 developed countries 
22 developed countries 
1992-2006 
1945-2006 
1992-2002 
1992-2002 
1980-2004 
1992-2002 
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          Table 2.7 Eurozone Effect on Trade Years 1992-2012 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Alpha Coefficients baseline interaction alternative dist with lag  GE base  GE inter  Exp/imp base Exp/imp inter 
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈   -0.25 -0.4 -0.35   -0.1   -0.1 
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙 
 
-0.6 -0.4 -0.6 
 
-0.7 
 
-0.7 
Beta Coefficients 
        𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙  
 
-0.270*** -0.531*** -0.220*** 
 
-0.251*** 
 
-0.248*** 
 
(-6.637) (-4.256) (-4.576) 
 
(-3.930) 
 
(-3.826) 
𝒈𝒈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏
𝜶𝜶𝒈𝒈 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊
𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙  
   
-0.0671* 
 
0.0189 
 
0.0158 
   
(-1.703) 
 
(0.392) 
 
(0.336) 
GDP 1 0.218 0.429* 0.424* 0.434* 
    
 
(0.910) (1.790) (1.762) (1.810) 
    GDP 2 0.543** 0.755*** 0.749*** 0.760*** 
    
 
(2.490) (3.413) (3.356) (3.433) 
    GDP/Capita 1 0.464* 0.208 0.208 0.201 
    
 
(1.701) (0.763) (0.761) (0.734) 
    GDP/Capita 2 0.0990 -0.157 -0.157 -0.165 
    
 
(0.388) (-0.607) (-0.601) (-0.635) 
    EMU 0.0941*** 0.0660** 0.0730** 0.0679** 0.103*** 0.0703* 0.103*** 0.0698* 
 
(3.187) (2.359) (2.575) (2.394) (2.739) (1.864) (2.784) (1.892) 
FTA 0.0186 0.00457 0.00428 0.00604 0.302*** 0.278*** 0.301*** 0.276*** 
 
(0.568) (0.142) (0.133) (0.187) (5.983) (5.526) (6.120) (5.638) 
RER 1  -0.343*** -0.281** -0.272** -0.280** 
    
 
(-2.683) (-2.245) (-2.179) (-2.232) 
    RER 2 -0.177 -0.115 -0.105 -0.114 
      (-1.479) (-0.974) (-0.892) (-0.963)         
Observations 11,142 11,142 11,142 11,142 63,206 63,206 63,206 63,206 
Year dummies and country-pair fixed effects included in all, specifications: 1-4 indust. countries only, 5-8 all 60 selected countries from Appen B.  
Cluster-robust t-statistics in parentheses , *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.8 GE Gravity Results for Eurozone Effect on Trade  
 (percent reduction in trade calculated from the hypothetical removal of the eurozone for year 2012) 
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Austria -1.91 
            Belgium 3.38 -5.43 
           France 5.52 3.91 -0.81 
          Germany 5.41 3.79 5.92 -1.05 
         Italy 5.59 3.97 6.10 5.99 -0.67 
        Luxembourg 4.87 3.24 5.38 5.26 5.45 -2.22 
       Netherlands 4.21 2.57 4.73 4.61 4.79 4.06 -3.63 
      Finland 5.60 3.98 6.11 5.99 6.17 5.46 4.80 -0.65 
     Greece 5.71 4.10 6.22 6.11 6.29 5.57 4.92 6.29 -0.41 
    Ireland 5.37 3.76 5.89 5.77 5.95 5.23 4.58 5.96 6.08 -1.13 
   Portugal 5.27 3.65 5.78 5.67 5.85 5.13 4.47 5.85 5.97 5.63 -1.35 
  Spain 5.54 3.93 6.05 5.94 6.12 5.40 4.75 6.12 6.24 5.91 5.80 -0.77 
 Slovakia 4.24 2.60 4.76 4.64 4.83 4.10 3.43 4.83 4.94 4.61 4.50 4.78 -3.56 
Percent  trade change for 
each country 5.23 3.46 5.42 5.21 5.70 4.58 4.06 5.50 5.87 5.03 5.53 5.76 4.63 
Percent  change in trade 
from all EMU countries 4.95 
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  Figure 2.1 Average Annual Oil Price 
 
 Figure 2.2 Ad Valorem Shipping Costs 
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Figure 2.3 Shipping Cost Ratios 
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3 Test for Optimum Currency Area and Monetary Independence in the Eurozone 
3.1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis had damaging effects on the eurozone, but perhaps 
the hardest hit were the periphery countries - Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece.  In 
the past few years Ireland and Portugal experienced unemployment rates around 15% 
while Greece and Spain had unemployment rates over 25%. In contrast the German 
unemployment rate never reached 8% and was below 5% at the end of 2014. These are 
significant differences given that the countries are highly integrated and share a 
common currency. The conventional explanation is that historically the periphery had 
higher interest rates and more stringent financial conditions than the other euro 
members. Once in the eurozone they were more easily able to raise funds from the 
other euro members due to the low interest rates and the elimination of the exchange 
rate risk that the euro provided. This led to the accumulation of mostly public debt for 
Greece and Portugal, and mostly private debt (a housing bubble) for Spain and Ireland. 
With the start of the financial crisis in 2008 the capital inflows to these countries came 
to a halt, thus causing spending and investment to slow, which in turn led to the massive 
economic downturn and the high unemployment that we see today. This dynamic is 
summarized in the countries’ interest rates prior to the creation of the euro area, and 
their current accounts after joining the currency union.  Figure 3.1 shows the short term 
interbank rates prior to the creation of the euro. As can be seen the periphery countries 
generally had interest rates above 5%, while Germany (and eventually the eurozone) 
had not exceeded this number. Figure 3.2 shows the current accounts after 1999. The 
figure indicates that for each year the periphery were net borrowers, while Germany 
became a net creditor. It appears that the borrowing intensified between 2003 and 
2008. Further, as the capital inflows slowed after 2008, the current accounts began to 
rise.  For a more detailed summary of the eurozone crisis see Lane (2012), Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2013), and Shambaugh (2012). 
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 As mentioned in the above papers, it appears that the monetary policy of the 
euro area was not ideal for the periphery as it kept interest rates too low. On the other 
hand, considering the current economic conditions, it appears to have been much more 
suitable for Germany and the other euro members. The goal of this paper is to more 
formally investigate these differences in desired monetary policy by using tests for 
monetary independence. In essence, these tests compare the euro monetary policy to 
the desired monetary policy of each member country. More specifically, in the conduct 
of monetary policy the ECB influences the short term interbank interest rate – the 
Euribor. This is considered a conventional monetary policy instrument and is the same 
percentage across all member countries. On the other hand, a country specific desired 
monetary policy may be indicated by a desired interest rate constructed from a Taylor 
rule. Therefore, to test the above hypothesis, we compare this desired interest rate for 
all member countries to the Euribor. If they closely match, then it can be said that the 
ECB policy resembles the desired policy of the member country; we expect this to be the 
case for Germany. On the other end, if there are significant differences, then the ECB 
policy does not correspond to the desired policy of the particular country; we expect 
this to be the case for the periphery. This analysis is in the spirit of Taylor (2007), and 
Khan (2010) who show that in the case of the U.S., the federal funds rate was below its 
desired (Taylor rule) interest rate prior to the crisis, and this, they argue, contributed to 
easy borrowing conditions which eventually led to the housing boom.  
The above interest rate comparison test can be considered a test for monetary 
independence within a currency union. When countries join a currency union, it is said 
that they officially give up their monetary independence.30 In the case of the eurozone, 
the duties have transferred to the common ECB. However, some countries might have 
desired interest rates that closely resemble those of the euro. For these, it is as if they 
have not really given up their own monetary policy as their desired interest rates are 
                                                          
30 Monetary independence means that the central bank is able to conduct its own monetary policy and 
therefore has control over the interest rate (or exchange rate) of its currency. In accordance with the 
trilemma, the central bank cannot influence both the interest rate and exchange rate independently 
unless it imposes capital controls. 
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being realized. In this case, they can be considered monetarily independent as they have 
retained their desired policy after joining the currency union. On the other hand, if their 
desired interest rates are significantly different from the euro rate, then these countries 
wish to have a different monetary policy, but they have to comply with the policy of the 
ECB. For these, the Euro comes at a significant cost and they can be considered 
monetarily dependent. In this paper we are not trying to make a causal argument as to 
whether particular countries influence the decisions of the ECB but only compare the 
movements across interest rates. 
The above tests can also be considered for optimum currency area tests 
different from the standard tests used in Mundell’s (1961) criteria of high labor mobility, 
symmetry of economic shocks, and flexibility of prices. Mundell’s optimum currency 
area criteria assess whether a common monetary policy suits the members of a currency 
union. Deviations from the criteria represent the overall cost of giving up their own 
monetary policy and (as Mundell states) thus not being able to use the exchange rate as 
an adjustment mechanism. Our monetary independence tests are also able to capture 
the essence of the criteria. Instead of using tests based on the criteria, we compare the 
monetary policy recommendations themselves directly; these are based on the desired 
interest rates. Countries that are considered monetarily independent have desired 
policies similar to those of the common central bank and therefore can be seen as 
forming an optimum currency area. On the other hand, countries that are considered 
monetarily dependent have significantly different desired policies. In this case the 
sharing of the common currency has come at a significant cost, and thus they do not 
form an optimum currency area. 
To summarize, there are two parts to the methodology. First, the desired 
interest rates are obtained using the renowned Taylor rule. In the literature, this 
interest rate has often been referred to as the as the optimum rate, the desired rate, 
and a benchmark or a guidepost for monetary policy. In the second part, the interest 
rate comparison tests follow key papers from the monetary independence literature. 
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Applying the above methodology, this paper is able to answer a few important 
questions. First; could the current struggles of the periphery countries have been 
foreseen prior to the crisis? By answering this question we are able to test the idea that 
the monetary policy of the ECB was too loose for periphery countries prior to the 
recession. Second; is the eurozone an optimum currency area – if not, which countries 
belong and which ones do not? Third; does belonging in the eurozone change the 
economic structure of countries so that they are a better fit for the common policies? 
Fourth; did countries make the necessary adjustments after the crisis so that they are a 
better fit for the currency union? 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 3.2 discusses the construct 
of the desired interest rates. Section 3.3 discusses the methodology of the monetary 
independence tests used in this paper. Section 3.4 reports the results. Section 3.5 
concludes. Figures and tables are at the end. 
3.2 The Desired Interest Rate   
This section constructs the desired interest rates for all original members of the 
eurozone from 1999 - 2014. Eventually, these are the interest rates that will be 
compared to the euro rate in the monetary independence tests. First discussed is the 
Taylor rule literature that these rates are based on, then the methodology in their 
construction and the data, and finally their computations and graphical results. 
3.2.1 The Taylor Rule 
 To construct the desired (Taylor rule) interest rates, this paper closely follows 
the methodology first discussed by Taylor (1993) and later augmented by Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler (CGG) (1998, 2000). The rule is an interest rate reaction function 
popularized by Taylor (1993):   
𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 
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In the rule, the central bank adjusts the actual short run interest rate (𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎) in 
accordance to inflation (𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎) and the output gap (𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎)31. This rule helps the central bank 
to combat inflation and reach the potential output level for economy. The alpha 
coefficients are policy function parameters chosen by the central bank. It is assumed 
that 𝛼𝛼1 > 1 and  𝛼𝛼2 > 0. By the rule, if there is inflationary pressure, then the central 
bank is to increase the interest rate (through contractionary monetary policy) by more 
than the inflation increase (𝛼𝛼1 > 1); this is known as the Taylor Principle. When there is 
a positive output gap, the central bank should also increase the interest rate (𝛼𝛼2 > 0). 
These interest rate increases ultimately increase the real interest rate which will combat 
inflation and help smooth the business cycle. Taylor (1993) shows that the fitted interest 
rate32 with set parameters (𝛼𝛼0,  𝛼𝛼1, 𝛼𝛼2 = 1 , 1.5, 0.5)  describes the federal funds rate 
well from 1987-1992, although the rule was never actually considered by the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC). Further, as pointed out by Taylor (1999), in the 
periods when the federal funds rate did not follow the Taylor rule, there were extended 
periods of inflation or capacity underutilization. Although the Taylor rule has not been 
mechanically followed in practice (having been only under some consideration at 
different central banks) 33, it describes the behavior of different central banks well. In 
particular, see Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) who study the pre-euro area of the 1990s 
and conclude that the euro countries do follow a Taylor rule. Also, Hayo and Hofmann 
(2006) compare the ECB to the Bundesbank and conclude that both follow the Taylor 
rule but with slightly different output gap responses. The notable paper, Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1998) looks at major world central banks and concludes that they follow a 
Taylor rule. This is not surprising; in accordance with theory, Woodford (2001) claims 
that if the goals are to limit inflation and stabilize output, then following a Taylor rule 
that is consistent with the Taylor principle is indeed optimum.     
                                                          
31 The output gap is defined by the difference between actual GDP and potential (long run) GDP. In times 
of economic booms the actual is above the potential, and in times of recessions, the actual is lower than 
the potential. Normally an HP filter is used for the construction of the output gap. 
32 Also known as the Taylor rule interest rate; in this paper it will be referred to as the desired interest 
rate. 
33 See Asso et al. (2010) for the Taylor rule’s role in practice. 
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 In papers by Clarida, Gali and Gertler - CGG (1998, 2000), the original Taylor rule 
is first augmented to include expectations, and then to include interest rate smoothing 
in its estimation. CGG first consider a forward-looking Taylor policy rule where the 
desired interest rate is given by a function of expected future economic conditions – 
inflation and the output gap: 
(1)            𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎∗ =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘] + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘] 
 Where: 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎∗ is the desired interest rate (or the target interest rate as in CGG). 
𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘] is expected future inflation for period 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑘𝑘 and 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘] is the expected 
future output gap for period  𝑎𝑎 + 𝑘𝑘. The alpha parameters are assumed to be unknown. 
The above equation produces the desired interest rate, however the behavior of the 
real world actual interest rate for many central banks is smoother.34 In particular, the 
model for the actual rate follows a weighted average of the lagged actual rate and the 
contemporaneous desired rate: 
 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎∗ + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎                                                              
 (2)                    = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝛼𝛼0 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘] + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘] + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎  
The way to obtain the desired interest rate is to estimate the above equation 
using generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation and obtain the structural 
alpha parameters. Then one can manually compute the desired rate in eq. (1) using 
these parameters and realized values for the inflation and the output gap.  
3.2.2 Methodology 
 The methodology in obtaining the country specific desired interest rates follows 
Clarida Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000). From eq. (1) the desired interest rate requires the 
alpha parameters and data on country specific output gap and inflation. To obtain the 
                                                          
34 As brought up in Goodfriend (1991), the federal funds rate shows high persistence and there are only 
fine adjustments (interest rate smoothing). CGG (2000 p. 152) argue two reasons for this: 1) When there 
are large adjustments, there is fear in the disruption of financial markets and uncertainty about their 
effects on the economy. 2) It is also perhaps not possible for the central bank to instantly make large 
adjustments.  
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alpha parameters, the estimation of eq. (2) is required.  Additionally, the data is only 
available on country specific inflation and output, and euro area specific inflation, 
output, and the actual interest rate (the Euribor).  The lack of country specific actual 
interest rates after 1999 prohibits the estimation of the country specific reaction 
function. Therefore, two methods are considered in obtaining the parameters. In 
method 1, the parameters are obtained from estimating eq. (2) using data for the whole 
euro area and then imposing the estimated parameters on all member countries. In 
method 2, it is possible to obtain country specific parameters using data prior to the 
creation of the euro area. In particular eq. (2) is estimated using country specific data on 
inflation, output, and the actual interest rate from 1985-1999. In this method the 
parameters are estimated before the creation of the euro but used after its creation. 
This assumes that the monetary policy reaction function is going to be the same in the 
euro area as it was a decade earlier.  
This paper considers method 1 to be the preferred method. There are a few 
reasons why, but first let’s start with the facts. It is worth to note that we are interested 
in comparing the desired country interest rate to the interest rate of eurozone, but 
ultimately we would want to compare all the country relationships against each other; 
otherwise there would not really be a baseline. Second, the computed desired interest 
rates in eq. 1 depend on two parts: the reaction function parameters (given by 
𝛼𝛼1, 𝛼𝛼2,𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝛼𝛼3) and the economic conditions (given by the output gap and inflation 
rate). In method 1 we are effectively fixing the reaction policies to be the same across 
countries, and in method 2 we allow for differences. Although the reaction policies 
might be the same across countries with method 1, the economic conditions will differ, 
thus producing different desired interest rates and thus a different desired monetary 
policy. The reasons for using method 1 and not method 2 are: 
1: The Taylor rule reaction function is optimum on theoretical grounds. If the ECB 
indeed follows the Taylor rule35 then it has goals to limit inflation and stabilize output. 
                                                          
35 As shown in the results, this does appear to be the case. 
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There is no reason why these will not be the same goals for the other members. For 
smaller countries, the reaction functions may change with the governing body of central 
banks, and having significant differences from the Taylor rule might not truly reflect 
what is best for the country. Having a Taylor rule reaction function of a large currency 
area is therefore reasonable. 
2: Having the same alpha coefficients across countries limits the basis of 
comparison to actual economic conditions. We thus know that the results are not simply 
due to differences in reaction function policy. It is a stronger argument to say that even 
if the monetary policy reaction functions were the same across countries, the countries 
would still differ significantly in their desired monetary policy due to differences in their 
economic conditions.  
3: Method 2 assumes that the reaction function from the late 1980s and 1990s is 
going to be the same as in the 2000s and 2010s for all countries of the eurozone. This is 
not very reasonable, as the science of monetary policy has progressed much more since 
then and countries have adjusted to following more strict monetary policies. 
4: The results from method 2 are not very robust. Should prior country data be 
used starting from 1985, 1990, or 1995? Different countries had different experiences 
during these years, governments and policies also change depending on the years. It is 
therefore not surprising that using different years also produces different parameter 
estimates depending on the country. Further many do not fit the model of CGG. Some 
do not follow the Taylor principle, a couple have negative inflation or output gap 
parameters, and a few also have eq. (2) with an estimated smoothing parameter 𝑝𝑝 > 1.  
Based on these arguments we decide to adopt method 1. With this method all 
the eurozone members will have the same reasonable reaction function, and we will be 
able to clearly see the differences in the desired rates based on their economic 
conditions. As a robustness check, traditional coefficients (from Taylor, 1993) for the 
constant, inflation, and output gap are imposed, and the results remain similar.  
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3.2.3 Data 
Following CGG this study will rely on monthly data in computing the desired 
interest rate. The IMF - International financial statistics (IFS) provides monthly data on 
CPI inflation and industrial production for the eurozone as a whole and all its members 
individually from January 1999 through December 2014. Seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rates are gathered from the OECD for the same countries and dates. The 
Figures 3.3-3.9 show these for the eurozone members and the eurozone as a whole. For 
estimating eq. (2), the actual interest rate is the three month Euribor rate also taken 
from the IFS. As in CGG the CPI inflation, defined as the annual change in the CPI, will be 
used as the inflation variable. As for the output gap, monthly data on GDP is not 
available; CGG instead use the cyclical component of detrended industrial production. 
However, as can be seen from Figure 3.3 there is not a large difference in the industrial 
production behavior between the countries. When the industrial production gap is 
considered the differences across countries are very small. Then, perhaps this is not a 
good representation of the economic conditions affecting the countries. As seen from 
the unemployment rates in Figure 3.4, Spain was clearly more affected by the crisis.  As 
mentioned in Longbrake (2008 p.46) and McCulloh (2007), the unemployment gap can 
be used as an alternative.36 The unemployment gap is the cyclical component of the H-P 
filter37 on seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rates. We choose to employ 
unemployment as the output variable for fourth reasons. Firstly, industry is a relatively 
small segment of the economy in many European economies (only 20-30 percent).38 
Secondly, it is more variable and more dissimilar across countries (See Figure 3.4). 
Thirdly, it provides a better fit in the estimation of eq. (2). Since unemployment is 
inversely related to output, the sign on its coefficient (𝛼𝛼2) is expected to be negative.  
                                                          
36 Ball and Tchaidze (2002) use a similar unemployment measure. 
37 As recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for monthly data the smoothing parameter used is 129600. 
38 See the CIA World Factbook - https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2012.html 
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3.2.4  Estimation Results 
Equation (2) is estimated using eurozone specific data. It is assumed that future 
inflation and unemployment is not observed at the time the interest rate is set; 
therefore their future realizations are instrumented using GMM IV. The instruments 
used are past lags of the variables in the model for months 1-6, 9, and 12 (as also used 
in CGG, 1998). The recent lags are more frequent as it is assumed that they are better 
predictors of the future variables. Also following CGG, the real effective exchange rate is 
included as a variable to control for foreign monetary shocks. Data for this variable is 
also taken from the IFS and is given as foreign currencies per unit of a home currency. 
Theoretically the central bank should lower interest rates when there is currency 
appreciation pressure (to keep the currency from appreciating further) and vice versa if 
there is currency depreciation pressure. However, as pointed out in Taylor (2001), the 
effects on the real exchange rate are usually taken into account in the expected future 
inflation and unemployment gap that are already in the model. Consistent with this 
theory, there is little difference in the results if the real exchange rate is not included. 
It is also important to choose the lead (𝑘𝑘) in the variables of eq. (2). Different 
values for the leads are considered. Table 3.1 shows the results for leads 3, 6, and 9. All 
produce similarly goods fits and the computed structural parameters of eq. 1 are shown 
at the bottom. As we can see the structural parameters follow the Taylor rule with 
computed coefficients of 𝛼𝛼1 > 1 and  𝛼𝛼2 < 0. The third lead is chosen in the 
computation; first it has the correct sign on the real exchange rate, and further the 
instruments are stronger in explaining the nearer future.39 As a final point, the 
monetary independence results remain similar no matter what lead is used. 
3.2.5 Figures 
 Figures 3.10-3.12 plot the computed desired interest rates from all original 
members of the eurozone, as well as the eurozone as a whole given in violet, and the 
actual eurozone rate given in black. As we can see the desired interest rates are much 
                                                          
39 When the model is run without instruments (only OLS) the 3rd lead produces the closest results to the 
GMM results. 
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more volatile than the actual eurozone rate. This is because the eurozone tends to 
substantially smooth interest rates; this can be seen from the estimated parameter of 
the lagged interest rate of .983 in Table 3.1. The interpretation of these results is 
discussed in the results in section 3.4. 
3.3 Monetary Independence and Optimum Currency Area Tests 
As stated in the introduction we are interested in comparing the desired interest 
rates in order to determine whether certain countries may be considered monetarily 
independent thus forming an optimum currency area. This section first introduces a 
brief literature review from the monetary independence and optimum currency area 
literatures. A few different monetary independence tests will be considered. The 
baseline test will simply be a summary of the graphical results showing the distance 
between the euro rate and the desired country rate. This baseline test does not provide 
enough detail as to the differences in movement between the rates. Therefore, the 
movement is analyzed further below by traditional monetary independence regressions; 
versions of these are also used for short run results.  Finally to validate the results a 
vector error correction model is run. 
3.3.1 Monetary Independence Literature 
In order compare the constructed desired rates and the eurozone rate, 
traditional monetary independence tests will be used. The methodologies in this paper 
will closely follow the key papers of Frankel et al. (2004) and Shambaugh (2004).40 These 
authors test to see if countries with a flexible exchange rate regime are more monetarily 
independent than those with a fixed exchange rate regime. To do this, the authors use 
regressions to compare the movement of a base country interest rate (mainly the U.S.) 
to the interest rate of a smaller home country. The logic in doing this stems from 
interest rate parity. Under a credible fixed exchange rate regime, the exchange rates are 
fixed and therefore the interest rates should be equal. However, as pointed out in 
Shambaugh (2004), one reason they might not be equal is due to the differences in risk 
                                                          
40 For similar studies also see Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005). 
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premium between the two countries. However, If these differences remain constant 
over time we should still see close movement between the two interest rates. On the 
other hand, if the small country has a floating exchange rate regime it is expected to 
have control over its own interest rate, therefore, there should not be a significant 
correlation between its interest rate and the base country interest rate. 
The two country version of the baseline regression in Frankel et al. (2004) is: 
(3)         𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 
Where: 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 is the small country interest rate and 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 is the base country interest 
rate in period 𝑎𝑎. It is concluded that if there is a good fit and the estimate of 𝛽𝛽1 is close 
to one, then the small country interest rate moves one for one with the base country 
interest rate, and therefore the small country is said to be monetarily dependent. On 
the other hand, if the estimate is not significant and closer to zero, it is assumed that the 
country is monetarily independent. Eq. (3) shows the long run relationships between the 
interest rates. Similarly, a first differenced regression will test for a short run 
relationship. For this paper, the coefficient interpretation is actually reversed; more on 
this later in the section.   
3.3.2 Optimum Currency Area 
 The monetary independence tests may also be considered optimum currency 
area tests. Countries are said to form an optimum currency area if there are high 
benefits and low costs to joining. A large benefit is the increased trade due to the 
elimination of exchange rate risk, the reduction of transaction costs, and the greater 
price transparency that a common currency provides. A large cost is the forgoing of 
individual monetary policy in order to pursue a common monetary policy. Mundell 
(1961) provides criteria to assess whether a common monetary policy would suit all 
members; this includes high labor mobility, symmetry of economic shocks, and flexibility 
of prices. Many papers test to see if there are symmetry of shocks/business cycles 
across the member countries by using simple correlations. For example see Bayoumi 
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and Eichengreen (1994), and Kim and Chow (2003). The last section compares our 
results to those of different papers.  These papers assume that if there is close 
symmetry then a common monetary policy would be suitable, and if there is 
asymmetry, then they would require different monetary responses, and therefore a 
common monetary policy will not be suitable. This literature is reasonable to assume 
that differences in shocks would require different policies but does not examine the 
magnitude of the differences. In other words these traditional tests never actually state 
what the recommended policy responses would be. The important questions are:  What 
are the monetary policy recommendations based on the shocks, and how do these 
policy recommendations differ across countries? Our method is able to answer these 
questions by comparing the policy recommendations themselves. Instead of computing 
different kinds of shocks we take a short cut and observe their effects through changes 
in the economic conditions (unemployment gap and inflation) which in turn produce 
changes in the desired interest rate; this is the monetary policy recommendation. If a 
country has a comparable desired interest rate to the euro rate then the ECB policy is 
suitable for the country and it can be considered to form an optimum currency area. On 
the other hand, if they are not comparable, then the ECB policy is not suitable for the 
country, and it is therefore not considered to form an optimum currency area.  
3.3.3 Baseline Test 
 The first test is a statistic of the distances between the interest rates. Consider a 
simple average absolute difference (AAD) : 
(4)    𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷) =  ��𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�
𝑎𝑎
/𝑇𝑇 
Where, 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 are the Euribor and a country specific desired interest rate in 
month t. This statistic represents the average distance between the two rates as shown 
for each country in the Figures 3.10 through 3.12. Countries with relatively low AAD 
have desired interest rates that closely match the euro rate; while countries with high 
AAD have desired rates that are significantly different from the euro rate. This statistic 
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could be used to test the hypothesis that the euro rate was too low for the periphery 
countries before the recent recession, and this led to the accumulation of debt and 
economic overheating.  
3.3.4 Monetary Independence Regressions 
The AAD statistic above compares how close the interest rates are to each other; 
however, this is only a broad monetary independence test. In the spirit of traditional 
monetary independence tests, there is an emphasis on comparing the movements of 
the interest rates instead. Although the interest rates may be close, their movements 
may not coincide and this might be important. For example, suppose there is an 
economic shock that affects the eurozone and all its members and thus requires a 
monetary response. The monetary response by the eurozone (of lowering or raising the 
interest rate) will thus benefit the countries that have recommended responses that are 
also similar. In this case countries that have desired rates which move with the euro rate 
will benefit the most.  
To test for similarities in movement we consider a traditional monetary 
independence regression and regress the euro rate on the desired country interest rate 
for each member: 
(5)         𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 
Here if the estimate of 𝛽𝛽1 is close to one and there is a reasonably good fit, then it can 
be said that the euro rate moves one to one with the desired country rate, and 
therefore, the country is considered monetarily independent because it is as if the euro 
rate is following its desired interest rate. On the other hand if 𝛽𝛽1 is different from one 
and there is a poor regression fit, then the member is considered monetarily dependent 
as it is bound to follow the policies of the euro instead of its own desired policies. It is 
important to note that when using the above regression we are not trying to make a 
causal argument as to whether the desired interest rate of a particular country causes 
the euro rate; we are simply using the regression to compare movement.  
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Running the above model leads to poor regression results for all members. 
Perhaps this is due to the substantial interest rate smoothing and the zero lower bound 
that are present in the actual euro rate. As shown in Figures 3.10 through 3.12 and 
Table 3.1, even the euro itself (in black) does not closely follow its desired rate (in violet) 
because of these factors. So a regression with the actual euro rate may  not be fully 
appropriate. Instead of using the actual euro rate, perhaps a better (and more apples-
to-apples) comparison is with the movement of the desired euro rate instead. To make 
this comparison more valid, it is reasonable to assume that given monetary autonomy, 
each country will also smooth its desired interest rate and also be unable to cross the 
zero lower bound. Then, a country with a desired rate similar to the desired rate of the 
eurozone will have an actual rate (given monetary autonomy) similar to the actual rate 
of eurozone. In this case, the actual ECB policy will be in line with the desired policy of 
the country although their interest rates (the actual euro and the desired country rate) 
might substantially differ. Given these reasons, this paper uses the desired euro interest 
rate instead of the actual euro rate in eq. (5). A basic augmented dicky – fuller test also 
reveals that the desired rates time series are stationary for all countries either at the 1% 
or the 5% levels, but causality is not argued here. 
3.3.5 Long, Medium, and Short Runs and a VECM  
Equation (5) looks at the behavior of the interest rates in the long run. Large 
differences in the movement here might indicate long term consequences. As an 
example, consider the Spanish desired rate in Figure 3.10. As we can see there was a 
larger increase in the desired rate of Spain relative to the euro from 2004-2008, and a 
larger drop after 2008. Therefore, when running the regression we expect to see a beta 
coefficient less than 1. One might interpret the increase as economic overheating 
generated from a housing bubble and the accumulation of debt, and the decrease as the 
harder crash that occurred during the crisis. The figures also show that the euro policy 
was not accommodative as the euro rate increased at a much slower pace.  
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As monetary policy is assumed to only influence the short run, it might be argued 
that there are no long term consequences from differences in long run movements. A 
further weakness is that the regression does not provide information on the exact 
timing of the interest rate movements. Ultimately, given shocks, it would be best if the 
euro response coincides with the desired response of the particular country. To test this 
eq. 5 is converted into first differences: 
  ∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 = 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 − 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖 
In standard first differences 𝑝𝑝 is 1; as the data is monthly, this can be seen as the 
monthly first difference. We also consider 𝑝𝑝 being 3, 6, and 12, to represent quarterly, 
semiannual, and annual first differences. These lengths represent similarities in 
movements across the short run and up to the medium and longer runs. Similarities in 
monthly first differences represent similarities in the effects of smaller shocks and parts 
of larger shocks. Maybe this horizon is too short to be of real concern and it is perhaps 
more important that policies coincide for longer horizons. Similarities in quarterly 
differences can represent the similarities in the accumulative effects of smaller shocks, 
or the effects of larger shocks such as the recent financial crisis or a large increase in the 
oil price. Therefore it is important for desired policies to coincide for this longer run so 
as to better stabilize the economy and avoid further deterioration during larger shocks. 
The regressions above see if the movements of the desired country rates 
coincide with those of the euro. To make sure the results are not a coincidence a vector 
error correction model (VECM) between the euro rate and each country rate is 
estimated. Besides being able to take into account the short and long run effects, the 
VECM is able to offer a causal argument by looking at influences from past lags. In 
particular, as the desired interest rates are based on economic conditions, the model 
will be able to determine whether shocks to the economic conditions of the euro 
influence the economic conditions of the particular country. Thus, in the spirit of 
traditional optimum currency area tests, this will measure how well the countries have 
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economically integrated with the eurozone. To test, consider estimates from the VECM 
below:  
(6)        ∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼11 +  𝜃𝜃1�𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶� + �𝛼𝛼12(𝑘𝑘)∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘
+ �𝛼𝛼13(𝑘𝑘)∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−𝑘𝑘
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶
𝑘𝑘
+ 𝑣𝑣1𝑎𝑎 
        ∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼21 +  𝜃𝜃2�𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝛽𝛽0 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶� + �𝛼𝛼22(𝑘𝑘)∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘
+ �𝛼𝛼23(𝑘𝑘)∆𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−𝑘𝑘
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶
𝑘𝑘
+ 𝑣𝑣2𝑎𝑎 
Where, the variables are defined as in eq. (5) with monthly first differences indicated by 
the deltas. Results from the AIC criteria indicate 𝑘𝑘 = 2 for most countries. Therefore, to 
be consistent across countries, two lags are used for all. These estimates along with the 
Choleski decomposition41 are then able to identify shocks to the euro and shocks to the 
country rates. Variance decompositions are then used to indentify how these shocks 
influence the movements of the variables after a given period. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Average Absolute Differences and Graphical Results 
Table 3.2 shows the average absolute differences (AAD) in the interest rates 
throughout the entire period. The first row is the AAD between the desired country 
rates and the actual eurozone rate, while the second row is with the desired eurozone 
rate instead. The largest differences indicated by the first row appear to be in Ireland, 
Spain, and Greece followed by Finland, Belgium, and Portugal. The numbers in the 
second row are also similar.  
The story of these differences is better told in Figures 3.10-3.12. In the figures, it 
can clearly be seen that Ireland and Spain, and to a lesser degree Portugal and Greece, 
                                                          
41 The variables are ordered so that the euro shocks could influence the desired country rate 
contemporaneously.  
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had higher desired rates before the crisis. This supports the conventional story that 
these countries overheated prior to the crisis and crashed much harder than the other 
members during the crisis. It appears that the monetary policy of the euro area was not 
accommodative and failed to smooth the business cycle for these members. On the 
other hand, it can be seen that Finland and Germany, and to a lesser extent France and 
Austria, had lower desired interest rates prior to the crisis. The countries suffered in this 
prior period, but as shown in the unemployment rate figures 3.6-3.8, they had a much 
more mild recession afterwards. As for Belgium and the Netherlands, there were 
periods when both had desired rates slightly above and below the actual rate; but their 
economies did not overheat and they also had more mild recessions. 
3.4.2 Regressions and a VECM 
 The results from running eq. (5) in levels are shown in Table 3.3. As we can see, 
the results indicate that the poorest fit is for Greece, Ireland, and Spain, and at the 
second tier are Portugal, Finland, and the Netherlands; on the other hand the best 
results are from Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Luxembourg. These results 
represent the long run and tend to be consistent with the ADD results. Continuing, Table 
3.4 shows the 𝛽𝛽1 estimates along with their regression R squared42 in the below line for 
all first difference regressions - the monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and annual. For the 
monthly first differences, we can see that only France and Germany tend to follow the 
euro rate because of this very short horizon. In the quarterly first difference we see a 
substantial improvement for Italy, Austria, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.43  There is 
also a further improvement for the semiannual and annual differences, and they more 
closely resemble the levels regressions. To interpret the results; relative to the other 
countries, only France and Germany appear to form an optimum currency area and be 
monetarily independent in the very short run. However, as mentioned in the previous 
section, the very short run only compares smaller shocks and parts of larger shocks; 
further due to the smoothing of the interest rate it is unlikely that the actual interest 
                                                          
42 As the regression only has two variables, the square root of the R squared is their Pearson correlation 
coefficient. 
43 Converting the data to quarterly and then taking the first difference produces very close results. 
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rate will be adjusted on a monthly basis following these short run fluctuations. The 
longer run results more clearly show the periphery as outliers. Perhaps these results are 
more important than the short run as they indicate how monetary policy would respond 
for larger shocks and for the sum of smaller shocks.  
The results of the variance decompositions from the VECM are shown in Table 
3.5. The table indicates the fraction of movement in the desired country rate that is 
explained by euro shocks after a given month. As the desired interest rates are functions 
of economic conditions the results may also be interpreted for economic conditions 
instead. For example according to the table, it can be said that the accumulative effects 
of euro shocks explain 77% of the variation in Austria’s economic conditions after 12 
months (the long run) but only 29% of the variation after 1 month (the very short run).44 
So it appears that in the very short run Austria is not influenced by the euro, however 
we can see larger influences in the medium to longer runs. As for the rest of the 
countries, it appears that the results are consistent with the initial regression results. 
For example, we see that euro shocks explain the most variation in the economic 
conditions (desired interest rates) of France and Germany after just one month; this is 
consistent with the monthly first difference regressions of Table 3.4. This is not 
surprising as further results (not shown) indicate that euro shocks explain over 90% of 
the variation in the euro rate for most time horizons (in all country specific VECM 
estimations); as euro shocks also explain much of the interest rate variation for some 
members then the country and euro rate will move together as shown in the regression 
results. Based on the results it appears that Austria, France, and Germany are the most 
integrated with the euro and thus can be considered to form an optimum currency area; 
in the second tier are Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Finland, while the 
periphery countries (expect for Spain in the short run) show the lowest euro integration.  
  
                                                          
44 Since there are only two variables, this means that 71% of the variation in Austria’s economic 
conditions is explained by an Austrian shock. 
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3.4.3 Further Questions and Robustness checks    
The general results above conclude that some member countries can be 
considered monetarily independent and thus form an optimum currency area with the 
euro. To answer the questions from the introduction, regressions from eq. (5) are run 
for different years: 1999-April 2008 (the peak of the desired interest rate series), 1999-
2003 (initial years), 2003-2008 (the housing boom), and 2010-2014 (the recovery 
period). Further, they are split by levels in Table 3.6, monthly differences in Table 3.7, 
and quarterly differences in Table 3.8. Besides answering the questions, these overall 
results can be used as a robustness check. As we can see, except for the long run results 
in Table 3.6, there are not drastic differences in the coefficient estimates across the 
sample splits. This indicates that the short and medium run results are not purely 
coincidental, and the regression model does a good job in comparing the overall 
economic integration with the euro. 
First, could the current struggles of the periphery have been foreseen prior to 
the crisis? As stated in the introduction the collapse of the periphery countries had to do 
with the periphery’s favorable borrowing conditions prior to the crisis. These imply long 
term consequences, so we refer to the long run 1999-2008 regressions in Table 3.6. 
From these we clearly see that the outliers are the Netherlands, Spain, and Ireland. It is 
interesting that the Netherlands is on the list but we can see from the figures and the R 
squared that the low coefficient has to do with the poor correlation and not because 
there was a substantial desired rate increase. It is also interesting to note that Greece is 
not on the list, and this is because it had followed the euro interest rate closely (in the 
long run), but looking from the graphs we see a drastic increase in its desired interest 
rate in the 2007-2008 period. If we instead look at the medium run results in Table 3.6, 
we clearly see that all the periphery countries (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have 
the lowest coefficients. The answer is yes. 
Second, does belonging in the eurozone change the economic structure of 
countries so that they are a better fit for the common policies?  This question has to do 
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with the endogeneity of optimum currency area criteria. Traditionally, this is the idea 
that countries become better suited for a currency union after they join the union.45 To 
answer this question we compare the initial period (1999-2003) with the latter period 
(2003-2008) and look for improvements in both the coefficient (close to 1) and the 
regression fit in Tables 3.6-3.8. In the long run results of Table 3.6 we see a significant 
improvement for the Netherlands, Finland, Greece46, Spain and Portugal. In Table 3.7 
we look at the short run and observe that there was a significant improvement in 
Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Spain.  In Table 3.8, the medium run, we see 
that there was significant improvement for Austria, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and 
Spain, Greece, and Portugal. In conclusion, with the exception of Ireland, we generally 
see improvements for countries that are a poorer fit to begin with, and little to no 
improvement for countries that are a good fit to begin with. This is evidence that the 
currency union is able to integrate the members that are less fitting, but it appears that 
it does not further integrate members that are already better off. Although the largest 
improvements were in the periphery, it appears that not enough years had passed to 
prevent their economic collapse. 
 Third and related, did countries make the necessary adjustments after the crisis 
so that they are a better fit for the currency union? The purpose of this question is to 
predict what the future holds for the eurozone. Here we are trying to see whether the 
members are becoming more integrated with the euro, and if after the recovery the 
currency union will emerge stronger thus fulfilling the desired policies of all its 
members. To answer the third question we compare the 2010-2014 period to the 2003-
2008 period. As the members are recovering it is perhaps not a good idea to compare 
the long run interest rates. For example, in Table 3.6 (the long run), Ireland shows a 
worsening situation with the euro rate after 2010. As we can see from Figure 3.12, this 
is because the desired interest rate for Ireland has been increasing since 2012 while the 
desired euro rate has decreased. The increase for Ireland was the large drop in 
                                                          
45 One of the first papers to discuss this is Frankel and Rose (1998), and the topic is reviewed in De 
Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). 
46 Greece only has two years of data for the initial period. 
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unemployment since 2012, and this does not necessarily mean that Ireland is not better 
integrated with the Euro. In this case the long run results can be misleading as we are 
dealing with recovering countries. To compare changes in integration we use the 
medium run results from Table 3.8 instead. Here, we see that Belgium, France, 
Germany, and Ireland show significant improvements in this period. Further, it might be 
a coincidence, but it appears that nations who improved their integration with the euro 
had a better recovery than those that did not. For example, if we compare the similar 
Latin countries of France and Italy we see that Italy had a pre-crisis unemployment rate 
reaching a low of 5.8 percent, and its unemployment currently (at the end of 2014) 
stands at 12.4 percent. On the other hand, the numbers for France are 7.1 percent 
before the crisis and 10.5 percent currently. Further we can compare the similar 
countries of Belgium and the Netherlands; the Netherlands result shows worsening 
integration after 2010 and it had a pre-crisis unemployment low of 3.6 percent and was 
close to 8 percent in 2014. On the other hand, Belgium had a pre – crisis low of 6.8 
percent and its 2014 unemployment was 8.5 percent. The similar countries of Germany 
and Austria can also be compared; from Table 3.8 it appears that Austria did not show 
improvement after 2010 while Germany did show significant improvement. The 
unemployment numbers for Austria are 3.8 percent pre-crisis and 5.6 percent in 2014, 
while the numbers of Germany are 8 percent pre-crisis and 4.8 percent in 2014. We can 
also compare the smaller countries of Portugal, and Ireland. Portugal does not appear to 
have improved integration with the euro after 2010, and its unemployment numbers 
are 5 percent pre-crisis and 13.6 percent currently and those of Ireland being 4.5 
percent before and 10.1 currently. The Overall results on whether the countries have 
become better integrated with the euro are mixed as many countries show stagnation 
or worsening. 
3.4.4 Results from Other Studies 
 Many studies have investigated whether the eurozone forms an optimum 
currency area. In particular, most approaches look at the symmetry of shocks and 
business cycles across countries. If they are highly correlated, then it is assumed that a 
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common monetary policy is suitable for all members and therefore they form an 
optimum currency area. Earlier papers placed an emphasis on the symmetry of shocks 
criteria. Bayoumi, and Eichengreen (1994) use the Blanchard and Quah decomposition 
to construct supply and demand shocks based on GDP and inflation for the euro area 
countries from 1960-1990. The countries with the highest shocks correlations are 
Germany, France, Netherlands, and Belgium while Italy, Portugal, Finland, and Ireland 
are the countries that fit the least with the rest; there is no data on Greece. Kim and 
Chow (2003) use GDP data on the euro countries and the US to construct domestic, 
regional, and global shocks. Variance decompositions from 1979-1998 indicate that 
regional (euro area) shocks explain much of the variation in output growth for France, 
and Austria, and explain the least amount for Ireland, Finland, Greece and Portugal. 
 More recent studies have looked at the symmetry of business cycles within the 
eurozone. In general the studies detrend country specific GDPs using a filter and then 
simply compare the cyclical components using correlations. Using this methodology and 
data from 1997-2004, Gouveia and Correia (2008) conclude that the business cycles are 
highly correlated except for Greece and Finland, further using rolling correlations from 
1984-2004 Greece shows a large decline integration over the period. Also using a similar 
methodology, Gogas (2013) shows that all euro countries have high correlations with 
the G3 – France Germany and Italy but only Greece shows a significantly lower 
correlation between 1999-2010. Also using a similar methodology and data from 2000-
2009, Papageorgiou et al. (2010) conclude that the least correlated members are Italy, 
Greece, Ireland, and Finland. Further Konstantakopoulou and Tsionas (2014), using data 
from 1960-2010, also conclude that Greece and Ireland have the weakest correlations 
with the euro.   
3.5  Conclusion  
 This paper uses a new methodology in testing whether the countries of the 
eurozone are monetarily independent and therefore form an optimum currency area. 
The overall results based on Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that the best candidates for an 
 
66 
optimum currency area are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg; these may 
also be considered monetarily independent. In the second tier are Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Finland followed closely by Portugal and Spain; and finally, Ireland and 
Greece show the poorest results. As a robustness check the VECM is able to show that 
the results are not entirely a coincidence; shocks to the euro area explain much of the 
variation in the desired rates for the top tier countries and they give poorer results for 
the periphery. Further, the first differences regressions in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are able to 
produce similar results for countries across different years; this can thus be used to infer 
economic integration. A few other conclusions can be made. First, it is clear that prior to 
the crisis Spain, Ireland, and (to an extent) Greece had large desired interest rate 
increases while the euro rate was kept relatively low. This is evidence that their 
economies overheated in the pre-crisis period and collapsed much harder after the 
crisis. Second, it can be concluded that the euro was initially able to integrate the least 
fitting members (except for Ireland) but this did not stop their larger crash during the 
crisis period. Lastly, only a few countries – France, Germany, Belgium, and Ireland show 
improved integration with the euro after 2010, and therefore it is uncertain whether the 
euro will emerge as a stronger union or continue to face problems within the near 
future.   
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   Table 3.1 Taylor Rule Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 3forward 6forward 9forward 
        
Inflation 0.0354*** 0.079*** 0.0879*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.0157) (0.0210) 
Unemp Gap -0.0319*** -0.0741*** -0.0952*** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0142) (0.0167) 
Real Exchange Rate -0.0318 0.0178 -0.129 
 
(0.0971) (0.103) (0.101) 
Lagged i-rate 0.983*** 0.971*** 0.963*** 
 
(0.00605) (0.00635) (0.00705) 
Constant 0.110 -0.175 0.497 
 
(0.447) (0.473) (0.461) 
    Observations 189 186 183 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
    Structural Coefficients from eq. 1 
Inflation 2.08 2.72 2.38 
Unemp Gap -1.88 -2.56 -2.57 
Real Exchange -1.87 0.61 -3.49 
Constant 6.47 -6.03 13.43 
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Table 3.2 Average Absolute Differences 
  Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
Actual Rate 1.97 2.26 1.73 1.90 1.33 1.73 1.93 2.55 4.21 2.12 3.00 3.59 
Taylor Rate 1.08 1.32 1.02 1.12 0.85 1.13 1.85 1.73 4.40 1.80 2.76 3.97 
 
 
  Table 3.3 Levels Regression 
VARIABLES Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
                          
desire euro rate 0.853** 0.650** 0.979** 0.986** 0.948** 0.839** 0.528** 0.559** 0.254** 0.523** 0.420** 0.189** 
 
(0.0396) (0.0230) (0.0280) (0.0383) (0.0426) (0.0422) (0.0437) (0.0300) (0.0131) (0.0368) (0.0190) (0.0311) 
Constant 0.209* 0.509** 0.797** 0.861** -0.149 -0.192 0.771** 1.042** 1.231** 0.573** 0.524** 1.299** 
 
(0.123) (0.0958) (0.0814) (0.101) (0.115) (0.134) (0.164) (0.115) (0.106) (0.144) (0.106) (0.158) 
             Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 165 
R-squared 0.714 0.788 0.829 0.797 0.808 0.734 0.382 0.675 0.601 0.643 0.683 0.171 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
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Table 3.4 First Difference Regressions - Beta Coefficient and R Squared 
 
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
Month Difference 0.457** 0.483** 0.736** 0.702** 0.577** 0.429** 0.378** 0.461** 0.310** 0.316** 0.455** 0.232** 
 
0.347 0.556 0.632 0.636 0.315 0.395 0.154 0.363 0.346 0.209 0.517 0.197 
Quarterly Difference 0.657** 0.555** 0.870** 0.927** 0.945** 0.686** 0.572** 0.568** 0.345** 0.486** 0.464** 0.336** 
 
0.564 0.670 0.801 0.774 0.633 0.656 0.275 0.532 0.579 0.430 0.651 0.303 
Semiannual Difference 0.754** 0.618** 0.905** 1.012** 1.060** 0.797** 0.657** 0.627** 0.355** 0.577** 0.501** 0.343** 
 
0.724 0.800 0.854 0.801 0.799 0.735 0.330 0.701 0.720 0.608 0.782 0.308 
Annual Difference 0.822** 0.640** 0.961** 1.055** 1.055** 0.873** 0.732** 0.640** 0.353** 0.619** 0.509** 0.319** 
 
0.798 0.841 0.887 0.837 0.819 0.757 0.419 0.772 0.759 0.694 0.798 0.261 
Coefficient estimates shown in first row                   
R squared shown in following row          
** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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                  Table 3.5 VECM - Variance Decompositions 
  
month Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
|1 0.29 0.52 0.59 0.64 0.27 0.33 0.16 0.31 0.18 0.15 0.43 0.13 
|2 0.42 0.51 0.66 0.72 0.44 0.55 0.23 0.40 0.23 0.21 0.42 0.17 
|3 0.51 0.56 0.73 0.75 0.56 0.62 0.30 0.48 0.29 0.28 0.46 0.21 
|4 0.58 0.59 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.65 0.36 0.52 0.31 0.31 0.48 0.23 
|5 0.62 0.60 0.80 0.78 0.63 0.67 0.40 0.55 0.31 0.31 0.48 0.23 
|6 0.66 0.61 0.82 0.78 0.64 0.66 0.44 0.57 0.31 0.31 0.47 0.23 
|7 0.68 0.61 0.84 0.78 0.64 0.65 0.47 0.58 0.29 0.30 0.45 0.22 
|8 0.71 0.61 0.85 0.78 0.64 0.63 0.49 0.59 0.28 0.29 0.42 0.20 
|9 0.73 0.60 0.86 0.77 0.64 0.61 0.51 0.59 0.26 0.28 0.40 0.19 
|10 0.74 0.60 0.87 0.77 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.59 0.24 0.26 0.37 0.18 
|11 0.76 0.59 0.88 0.76 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.22 0.25 0.35 0.16 
|12 0.77 0.58 0.88 0.75 0.61 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.15 
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 Table 3.6 Sample Split Level Regressions (Long Run) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
1999-2003 0.663** 0.504** 0.696** 0.810** 1.040** 0.744** 0.507** 0.385** 0.365** 0.574** 0.343** 0.0668 
 
0.760 0.688 0.728 0.868 0.844 0.796 0.524 0.281 0.647 0.638 0.250 0.005 
2003-2008 0.704** 0.618** 0.761** 0.752** 1.191** 0.871** 0.866** 0.480** 0.326** 0.931** 0.390** 0.665** 
 
0.556 0.441 0.497 0.835 0.548 0.658 0.635 0.795 0.686 0.585 0.723 0.538 
1999-2008 0.688** 0.554** 0.737** 0.751** 1.086** 0.782** 0.312** 0.420** 0.338** 0.506** 0.382** 0.614** 
 
0.655 0.556 0.584 0.847 0.679 0.719 0.360 0.584 0.684 0.495 0.512 0.482 
2010-2014 0.919** 0.542** 1.104** 1.010** 0.641** 0.658** 0.766** 0.628** 0.0628 0.366** 0.521** 0.0837** 
 
0.807 0.923 0.885 0.716 0.956 0.800 0.547 0.771 0.008 0.598 0.428 0.114 
Coefficient estimates shown in first row 
        R squared shown in following row 
         
** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
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Table 3.7 Sample Split Monthly (Short Run) First Difference Regressions 
 
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
1999-2003 0.244** 0.445** 0.564** 0.584** 0.366 0.177* 0.0893 0.507** 0.250** -0.135 0.0889 0.242** 
 
0.111 0.489 0.575 0.577 0.094 0.111 0.013 0.511 0.227 0.031 0.021 0.315 
2003-2008 0.340** 0.332** 0.599** 0.546** 0.344** 0.468** 0.385** 0.310** 0.320** 0.160** 0.601** 0.181* 
 
0.302 0.393 0.595 0.522 0.132 0.382 0.175 0.215 0.231 0.051 0.604 0.089 
1999-2008 0.305** 0.372** 0.579** 0.561** 0.351** 0.288** 0.228 0.390** 0.281** 0.0413 0.311** 0.208** 
 
0.213 0.427 0.580 0.545 0.115 0.211 0.073 0.326 0.225 0.003 0.209 0.151 
2010-2014 0.243** 0.422** 0.727** 0.657** 0.397** 0.365** 0.307** 0.263** 0.246** 0.238** 0.407** 0.102** 
 
0.096 0.363 0.417 0.459 0.267 0.298 0.157 0.132 0.205 0.302 0.577 0.101 
Coefficient estimates shown in first row 
        R squared shown in following row 
         ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
 
  Table 3.8 Sample Split Quarterly (Medium Run) First Difference Regressions 
 
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Spain Greece 
1999-2003 0.366** 0.485** 0.776** 0.737** 0.828** 0.493** 0.192 0.589** 0.321** 0.0362 0.136* 0.280** 
 
0.156 0.625 0.760 0.751 0.352 0.445 0.052 0.569 0.459 0.002 0.058 0.209 
2003-2008 0.469** 0.355** 0.673** 0.709** 0.796** 0.639** 0.613** 0.405** 0.299** 0.453** 0.603** 0.433** 
 
0.483 0.367 0.737 0.656 0.370 0.576 0.424 0.290 0.244 0.296 0.732 0.385 
1999-2008 0.439** 0.409** 0.700** 0.718** 0.802** 0.564** 0.404** 0.475** 0.311** 0.257** 0.338** 0.374** 
 
0.334 0.470 0.727 0.696 0.357 0.507 0.205 0.395 0.337 0.100 0.295 0.301 
2010-2014 0.456** 0.495** 0.963** 0.861** 0.656** 0.622** 0.403** 0.401** 0.333** 0.292** 0.410** 0.109** 
 
0.313 0.611 0.639 0.639 0.648 0.591 0.216 0.363 0.441 0.423 0.596 0.100 
Coefficient estimates shown in first row 
        R squared shown in following row 
         ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
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 Figure 3.1 Interest Rates 
 
 Figure 3.2 Current Account 
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 Figure 3.3 Industrial Production Index 2010 = 100 
 
 
 Figure 3.4 Unemployment Rates 1 
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 Figure 3.5 Unemployment Rates 2 
 
 
 Figure 3.6 Unemployment Rates 3 
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 Figure 3.7 Inflation Rates 1 
 
 
 Figure 3.8 Inflation Rates 2 
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 Figure 3.9 Inflation Rates 3 
 
 
 Figure 3.10 Desires Interest Rates 1 
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 Figure 3.11 Desired Interest Rates 2 
 
 
 Figure 3.12 Desired Interest Rates 3 
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
pe
rc
en
t
19
99
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
01
m
1
20
02
m
1
20
03
m
1
20
04
m
1
20
05
m
1
20
06
m
1
20
07
m
1
20
08
m
1
20
09
m
1
20
10
m
1
20
11
m
1
20
12
m
1
20
13
m
1
20
14
m
1
20
15
m
1
month
Austria Finland
Greece Portugal
euro area actual rate
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
20
pe
rc
en
t
19
99
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
01
m
1
20
02
m
1
20
03
m
1
20
04
m
1
20
05
m
1
20
06
m
1
20
07
m
1
20
08
m
1
20
09
m
1
20
10
m
1
20
11
m
1
20
12
m
1
20
13
m
1
20
14
m
1
20
15
m
1
month
Belgium Luxembourg
Holland Ireland
euro area actual rate
 
79 
 
4 Monetary Independence and Capital Controls: The Case of Asian Countries 
4.1  Introduction 
As stated in Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005) open economy countries 
have a desire for a stable exchange rate, free capital mobility and a monetary policy 
oriented towards achieving domestic goals (monetary independence). However, 
according to monetary policy trilemma, only two out of the three goals are possible at 
any given time. For example, if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, then it will 
have to impose capital controls in order to achieve monetary independence. If a country 
has a fixed exchange rate regime and wants to keep its economy free of capital 
restrictions, then it must follow the monetary policy of the foreign country and will 
hence lose its monetary independence. If the country wants to pursue an independent 
monetary policy free of capital restrictions then it must have a flexible exchange rate 
regime.47  
In order to achieve monetary independence goals, restricting capital mobility 
might not be beneficial because economic theory suggests that free capital mobility will 
lead to optimal allocation of resources and should therefore be pursued (Ostry et al. 
2010). However, the IMF (2012) has recently concluded that capital controls are useful 
for calming volatile capital flows in emerging economies. Likewise, Magud et al. (2011) 
states that large capital inflows to emerging markets may cause exchange rate 
appreciation and fuel asset price bubbles; when there is a reversal and capital starts 
leaving (outflow), this can lead to large currency depreciation and an economic 
downturn such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Recently, it has been argued that in a 
world with globalized capital markets maintaining monetary independence without 
capital controls has become more difficult. Rey (2015) argues that the only way to 
                                                          
47 Some mixture of intermediate regimes may be considered. It is important to note that the 
trilemma hypothesis emphasizes the tradeoff among the three goals.  
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achieve monetary independence is through imposing capital controls, regardless of the 
exchange rate regime. This suggests that the trilemma has turned into a dilemma 
between free capital mobility and monetary independence. 
In this paper we attempt to quantify all the variables of the trilemma and to 
investigate the relationships among the three - monetary independence, exchange rate 
flexibility, and capital controls. All three objectives are more or less conceptual and need 
to be quantified for empirical study. Although there are no agreed-upon methods, 
existing studies fall into a couple of broad categories.  
The first category includes Frankel et al (2004), Shambaugh (2004), Obstfeld et 
al. (2005), Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010), and Klein and Shambaugh (2015). In these 
papers, the first step in testing the trilemma is through obtaining a measure of 
monetary independence. In general this is done by having a large sample of countries in 
a panel regression where the home country interest rate is regressed on its anchor or 
base interest rate (generally the U.S. federal funds rate). The regression fit and the 
coefficient magnitude then determine monetary independence. In general if there is a 
good regression fit and a base rate coefficient close to one, then the country is 
considered monetarily dependent on the base country, and if there is a poor fit, it is 
considered monetarily independent. 48 The measures of capital controls in these papers 
are usually taken from IMF databases – they are annual, de jure, and usually coded as 
yes or no; sometimes the sample is simply split based on years that were known to have 
capital controls. Similarly for exchange rate flexibility, the country is coded by a binary 
variable and generally based on high or low volatility in the exchange rate over the given 
year. There are a few ways capital controls and exchange rate flexibility are taken into 
account by the monetary independence result; either the sample is split in accordance 
to yes or no measures of capital controls and exchange rate flexibility or sometimes the 
sample is not split but dummy variables are used in representing these. In general, the 
results show that countries with exchange rate flexibility and capital controls have an 
                                                          
48 See eq. (2) in section 3 of this paper.  
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interest rate that does not closely follow the U.S. rate thus indicating monetary 
independence. On the other hand countries that have a fixed exchange rate without 
capital controls have an interest rate that more closely follows the U.S. thus indicating 
monetary dependence. 
The second category includes Aizenman et al. (2010) and You et al. (2014). Here 
the authors measure monetary independence as the annual correlation of monthly 
interest rates. Exchange rate flexibility is measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
exchange rates for each year. Capital controls are annual and either taken from the 
Chinn- Ito Index (see Chinn-Ito, 2008) or are based on Shindler (2009) both of which are 
in turn constructed from the de jure IMF – Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
(AREAER). To test the trilemma, You et al. (2014) regress the monetary independence 
measure on capital controls and exchange rate regime in a panel regression. They find 
evidence that flexible exchange rate regimes and various measures of capital controls 
positively influence monetary independence.  
The above trilemma tests generally employ de jure measures of capital controls 
and measures of exchange rate flexibility that are somewhat too coarse and loosely 
related to theory. For our tests of the trilemma, we develop a methodology that is more 
in accordance with theory. The methodology is summarized in the next section. To see 
how our measures fit with real world data we choose the Asian countries. These 
countries are highly integrated to international capital markets as evidenced by the 
strong effects during the Asian financial crisis. But since the crisis, different countries 
have adopted different types of capital controls and have different exchange rate 
regimes. There are countries that have no capital controls and exchange rate flexibility 
(Japan) and countries with no capital controls and a firmly pegged exchange rate regime 
with the U.S. dollar (Hong Kong). There are also countries that have strict capital 
controls (China). Table 4.1 summarizes the countries based on their exchange rate 
regime, their standard deviation of actual exchanges rates (in logs), and KAOPEN − the 
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Chinn-Ito de jure capital controls index −  where a larger number indicates more 
controls.  
This paper has two main objectives. First, we present continuous time-series 
estimates of capital controls for the Asian countries. Second, we construct an improved 
measure of monetary independence based on the model that includes the desired or 
optimal interest rate as well as the base interest rate.  We use the Taylor rule interest 
rate as the desired rate. In standard monetary independence regressions a country 
following the base interest rate is considered monetarily independent. Such models may 
be miss-specified to the extent that a country can follow its own “independent” 
monetary policy that turns out to be very similar to that of the base country (the U.S. or 
Germany). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present our 
trilemma measure and show graphical results for the Asian Countries. In section 4.3, we 
construct monetary independence tests using a traditional regression for each country. 
We then observe how monetary independence is influenced by our measure of 
exchange rate regime and capital controls. In section 4.4, we modify the monetary 
independence tests to include the Taylor rule interest rate and a show a VAR for short 
run results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2  Measuring the Trilemma 
As mentioned in the above papers, there is no agreement as to how each 
component of the trilemma is measured. In the literature, capital controls are measured 
from the de jure index provided by the IMF, and the exchange rate regime is measured 
by a de jure classification of the IMF or by an annual deviation measure of the actual 
exchange rate. The good news is that the trilemma has a theoretical foundation. In 
theory the link between the base country interest rate (generally assumed to be the U.S. 
federal funds rate) and the home country interest rate can be expressed as a capital 
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control augmented interest rate parity condition. Klein and Shambaugh (2015)49 
consider:  
 𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 +  𝐸𝐸[∆𝑌𝑌] + 𝑘𝑘 
where 𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 is the home country interest rate, 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 is the base country interest rate, 𝐸𝐸[∆𝑌𝑌] =
𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎+1] − 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎, is the percentage change in the expected exchange rate from the spot 
rate, and 𝑘𝑘 are capital controls. From this equation, monetary independence is generally 
measured by the differences in movement between the base country interest rate and 
the home country interest rate. Highly correlated movements indicate similarity in 
monetary policy and therefore the home country is considered monetarily dependent 
on the base country. If there are differences in movement between the interest rates, 
then this is either due to changes in 𝐸𝐸[∆𝑌𝑌] or changes in 𝑘𝑘.50  
To obtain the trilemma measures we closely follow Ma et al. (2004), Ma and 
McCauley (2008), and Kohli (2012). In these studies, the authors argue that the non-
deliverable forward (NDF) rate can be used to measure expected exchange rates and 
therefore the existence of capital controls. The NDF market in Asia emerged in the late 
1990s after the Asian financial crisis when restrictions were placed on foreigners in the 
onshore forward market. The NDF market is a forward market where physical currencies 
are not exchanged and the transactions are settled in dollars.51 The advantage of the 
NDF market is that it is offshore and not restricted by the home country; it is therefore 
argued that it could be used to measure expected exchange rates and therefore the 
existence and intensity of capital controls. In particular, the authors compute an 
imputed rate 𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 + ln(𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹) − ln(𝑌𝑌) , where 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 is the NDF exchange rate against 
                                                          
49 See p.4 of the NBER working paper version.  
50 It is important to note that the interest rate linkage and monetary independence are based on 
expected, not actual, exchange rate changes. For example if a country has declared a pegged exchange 
rate, even if there are no capital controls (𝑘𝑘 = 0), it may still have some monetary independence to the 
extent that it can influence an expected exchange rate different for the spot exchange rate; in this case its 
exchange rate regime is not credible. 
51 See appendix F for NDF market details. Theoretically the NDF is supposed to equal the expected future 
exchange rate. If they are not equal then we know that the expected future exchange rate is pinned down 
by interest rate parity - if the NDF rate is different than that, then there would be arbitrage opportunities 
by signing a forward contract and moving capital from one country to the other. 
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the dollar, and 𝑌𝑌 is the spot exchange rate. Ma et al. (2004) and Ma and McCauley 
(2008) also argue the difference between the actual home interest rate and the imputed 
rate measures capital controls, viz., 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 −  𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼, because 𝑘𝑘, if positive, can be seen as 
an ad-valorem tax equivalent on inflows. On the other hand, a negative 𝑘𝑘 represents an 
ad-valorem tax equivalent capital control on outflows. Replacing for the imputed rate, a 
capital control augmented covered interest parity is obtained:  
(1)            𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 = ∆𝐷𝐷 + 𝑘𝑘 
where ∆𝐷𝐷 = ln(𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹) − ln(𝑌𝑌) is the forward discount on the home currency. This is the 
same condition as the previous interest rate parity condition but with the NDF rate 
replacing the expected future exchange rate.  
The above condition summarizes the trilemma. It can be best illustrated by 
examples. (A) Under a credibly fixed exchange rate (∆𝐷𝐷 = 0) and free capital mobility 
(𝑘𝑘 = 0), a country has no monetary independence (𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵). (B) To gain monetary 
independence (𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵), it needs to impose some restrictions on capital movement (𝑘𝑘 ≠
0) or move towards a more flexible exchange rate system (∆𝐷𝐷 ≠ 0). 52 
4.2.1 Data and Graphs 
 In our empirical study we use data on ten Asian countries – China, Malaysia, 
Japan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The 
choice of countries is based on data availability which spans from 1999 to 2015 and 
includes interbank interest rates, nominal dollar exchange rates, inflation, industrial 
                                                          
52 In the real world, capital controls are not the only reason covered interest parity will be violated; there 
might also be risk related reasons. First, if there is counterparty risk in the forward exchange market so 
that some of the contracts are not fulfilled then this will discourage capital flows. If this risk is present 
then it will influence the forward rate and then be part of computed capital controls. To overcome the 
risk, this paper uses data (where possible) from the less risky offshore NDF market rather than the 
onshore forward market. As the forward transactions in the NDF market are settled in dollars, there is less 
risk because the principle amounts do not move and currency does not need to be physically exchanged. 
See Lipscomb (2002) and Shamah (2008) for details. A second type of risk is country investment risk. From 
the example, risk on investment in the home country will also discourage inflows. To solve this problem, 
we follow Shambaugh (2004) and assume that this risk stays constant over time. The overall results of this 
paper are determined by the movements in capital controls and interest rates over time; constant risks 
will not change the results.  
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production and unemployment. NDF market rates are available for five countries – 
China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, and Korea. For the rest, the onshore forward market 
rate is used.53 The 3 month U.S. interest rate is used as the base rate.  A complete data 
description is available in Appendix E. 
To measure the trilemma components - First, the spot and NDF exchange rate 
data are used to compute the ∆𝐷𝐷. Then using data on interest rates we compute the 
capital controls measure 𝑘𝑘 from eq. (1). Figures 4.1-4.10 show graphical results for all 
countries. The top portion of the graphs has the U.S. base rate, the home country rate, 
and the Taylor rule rate for the home country (to be discussed in section 4.4). The 
bottom portion has the interest rate differential (𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵), exchange rate difference 
(∆𝐷𝐷) along with the de jure measures of capital controls on inflows (green) and outflows 
(yellow) taken from Shindler (2009) and You et al. (2014). For the latter, a higher value 
represents more controls given on the right hand axis. The difference in the dark blue 
and dark red curves represents deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) and thus 
represents capital controls in our measure. When the blue line is above the red 
then 𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 > ∆𝐷𝐷, and so there are controls on inflows (𝑘𝑘 > 0), otherwise there would 
be arbitrage opportunities by borrowing from abroad and investing in the home 
country. When the blue is below the red, then the difference represents controls on 
outflows (𝑘𝑘 < 0).  
These figures provide the first evidence for the trilemma. It appears that China 
(Figure 4.1) and Japan (Figure 4.3) have interest rates that are relatively steady 
compared to the U.S; therefore, they can also be considered monetarily independent as 
shown in the results of the next section. However, Japan has almost no capital controls 
and the differences in the interest rate movements are achieved mainly through 
exchange rate flexibility. China is known to have used capital controls extensively; see 
Ma and McCauley (2008) and Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2014). Our results also 
                                                          
53 There are no NDF markets for the Japanese yen, the Hong Kong dollar, or the Singapore dollar as cross-
border capital flows are largely free from government restrictions. Further, Thailand does not have an 
NDF market (see Appendix F), and the Malaysian time series are too short as their NDF market for their 
currencies were only developed recently.  
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indicate that markets have expected a great deal of exchange rate movement. On the 
other extreme, Hong Kong has a currency board with U.S. dollar since 1983 and almost 
no capital controls. Its interest rate moves very closely with the base rate (of the U.S.). 
This is a typical case of a monetarily dependent economy.  
These examples show the effects of the trilemma – monetary independence can 
be achieved with either exchange rate flexibility (Japan) or capital controls (China), but if 
the country has neither (Hong Kong) it must be monetarily dependent.  
4.2.2 Comparing Capital Controls 
This subsection briefly compares our de facto measures of capital controls to de 
jure measures and media reports on capital controls. One problem with the de jure 
measures of capital controls is that they only measure government’s official restrictions 
which may not necessarily be consistent with the actual level of capital controls. The 
bottom of Figures 4.1-4.10 provide a comparison of our de facto measures with the 
Schindler (2009)-type de jure measures.54 De jure measures are in step changes as they 
are only annually provided. The scale, as shown in the right side of the bottom figures, is 
from 0 to 1 with 1 being the most controlled.  
Sometimes when there are de jure controls they might not be effective (produce 
CIP deviations) and so they might not correspond well with our de facto measure, but 
we should expect that when the de jure measures are 0 then so would our de facto 
measure. In other words when there are no de jure capital controls, the CIP condition 
should hold almost exactly. This is evidenced by Japan from 1999-2006 in Figure 4.3; as 
we can see during this period there were no de jure controls on outflows and inflows, 
correspondingly we also see that the blue and red curves are almost on top of each 
other. We also see that Japan had effective capital inflow restrictions before 1999 
(during Asian financial crisis). During this time period the green curve is a bit higher and 
consistently our de facto measure shows that the red curve is mostly below the blue. 
                                                          
54 See You et al. (2014) for information regarding the construction of de jure measures employed in the 
Chinn-Ito Index, and Schindler (2009). 
 
87 
Further, we also see that it is not until the increase in the inflow controls during 2008 
that there is a difference between the blue and red curves thus indicating that the 2008 
de jure inflow control is also effective. In marked contrast to Japan, China has had 
strong capital controls throughout the whole period according to the de jure measures. 
Our de facto measure shows their effectiveness more precisely through the varying 
deviations between the interest rate differential and the forward discount. We also find 
the evidence of some capital controls that are not reported in the de jure index. (For 
instance, Singapore seemed to have effective controls on outflows in the 2004 period.)  
Table 4.3 also lists some important government announcements. Thailand 
tightened its capital controls in 2003 and during 2006-2008, both controls seem to work 
as there was an intermediate spike in the difference between interest rate differential 
and the exchange rate differential. Indonesia tightened its capital controls in 2001, 
2006, and 2009 respectively, but the 2009 one is most effective because there was an 
intermediate spike in the difference between interest rate differential and the exchange 
rate differential. India, Korea and Hong Kong also imposed some restrictions on capital 
flows during and after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. However, their effects are not as 
strong as Indonesia and Thailand. Because this was during the crisis, it is possible that 
there was increased exchange rate risk and country risk, both of which could have 
produced the results. However, it is also possible that there was expected future 
depreciation and the government imposed controls to prevent its currency from actually 
depreciating; this is discussed in the next section. In summary, our de facto measure 
captures capital controls well, and more importantly, provides more accurate 
information about the effectiveness and dynamics of capital controls than de jure 
measures. 
4.3 Monetary Independence and the Effects of Capital Controls 
  How do capital controls contribute in achieving monetary independence? 
Conventional wisdom (until recently) is that capital controls are largely ineffective. More 
recently, economists including IMF (2012) have started giving more positive views on 
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capital controls.  Rey (2015) argues that capital controls are required to achieve 
independence regardless of exchange rate flexibility. This section first conducts 
monetary independence tests and then compares the variance of capital controls to the 
variance of exchange rate changes to determine which component dominates. 
4.3.1 Monetary Independence 
 For a measure of monetary independence, we closely follow the methodologies 
of Frankel et al. (2004) and Shambaugh (2004). Consider first the conventional 
regression: 
(2)     𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 
If the coefficient 𝛼𝛼2 and the R squared are both close to 1 then the home country rate 
moves with the foreign country rate and the home country is therefore considered 
monetarily dependent.  On the other hand when they are both near zero we can 
conclude that there is little or no relationship and the home country is considered 
monetarily independent. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test for all interest 
rates using the lag length selected by the Ng-Perron (2001) criteria. The results show 
that interest rates are stationary to at the 10% level with the exceptions of India, China, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia.55  Interestingly, the base rate (of the U.S.) appears the most 
stationary of all rates. As the results of the unit-root test are split, we proceed to 
estimate eq. (2) in levels and report the results in Table 4.4. This could be interpreted as 
a cointegration regression if the interest rates are nonstationary indeed. (In a later 
section, we also consider the results of estimation of eq. (2) in differences and also using 
a VAR model with an error correction term.) 
Table 4.4 reports the regression results for eq. (2). The results are listed from 
countries that are the most independent to least independent. As there are two 
components that determine independence – correlation (R squared) and magnitude 
                                                          
55 These are non-stationary, however they do not show a strong relationship with the base rate. 
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(the 𝛼𝛼2), the table lists the countries from the least correlated interest rates. China, 
Malaysia, India, and Japan appear to be the most independent. These are followed by 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and finally Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong which 
appear to be the most dependent. An interesting case is Indonesia which shows a 
significant coefficient close to 1 but a poor R squared.56  
4.3.2 Exchange Rate Changes or Capital Controls? 
 The above regression states that for monetary independence to exist there must 
be differences in the movement between the base rate and the home rate. Differences 
in interest rate movement imply that there must be variation in the interest rate 
differential. As shown in eq. (1), this variation will depend on the variation in the capital 
controls (𝑘𝑘) and the variation in the forward premium (∆𝐷𝐷). Table 4.5 reports a 
summary of the sample standard deviations for these components.  The first row lists 
the standard deviation in the capital controls for each country, the second is the 
standard deviation of ∆𝐷𝐷, and the third is the standard deviation in the interest rate 
differential (𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵). The last row is the standard deviation of actual exchange rate 
changes that are based on Table 4.1. 
As we can see the results from the monetary independence regressions tend to 
be consistent with the interest differential in that the higher the variation in the 
differential the lower the monetary independence.  It appears that based on this 
measure, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong are the most dependent on U.S. 
policy. Except for Thailand, these countries have low capital controls and grater 
exchange flexibility. We also see that the most independent countries rely either mostly 
on capital controls (China), or exchange flexibility (Japan), or combinations of both.  
Thailand and Indonesia seem to be exceptional. Thailand has high capital 
controls and exchange rate flexibility but nevertheless has relatively low to medium 
degree of monetary independence. As we can see from Figure 4.7, this result is mainly 
                                                          
56 It turns out that its desired interest rate explains much of home rate variation and 𝛼𝛼2 actually turns 
negative when the desired rate is included. 
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due to the large controls on inflows imposed by Thailand around the 2006-2008 period 
in order to keep the actual exchange rate (not graphed) from appreciating. Theoretically 
from eq. (1), if there are large inversely related movements between ∆s and 𝑘𝑘 the 
interest rate stays about the same. As we can see from the figure, this explains why 
Thailand had a rather low interest rate differential but large variations in ∆𝐷𝐷 and 𝑘𝑘. The 
scenario is similar for Indonesia for the 2008-2009 period but due to actual exchange 
depreciation pressure, the authority imposed controls on outflows instead.57  
Overall the results are consistent with what can be discerned from the graphs. 
They suggest that the trilemma is valid for this group of Asian countries. Simply put, 
both exchange rates and capital controls play a role in explaining the differences in 
movement between home and base rates. We see that for all countries except China, 
exchange rate flexibility actually explains most of the interest rate differentials. The 
results also are consistent for countries with known exchange regimes and capital 
controls. For instance, countries that have low exchange rate flexibility and low capital 
controls (Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong) tend to be the most monetarily dependent, 
while those that have higher exchange flexibility and capital controls generally have 
more monetary independence. 
                                                          
57 For a possible explanation consider the interest rate parity condition: 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎+1] − 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 + 𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎. 
Suppose initially all variables are at 0. Normally, we think that when there is an 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 increase there would 
be capital inflows and 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 would appreciate (decrease) until there are no more arbitrage opportunities. In 
order to prevent some of the appreciation the government can impose capital controls on inflows 𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎 > 0. 
In this case all variables (𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 ,𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎+1] − 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 , 𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎)  move in the same upward direction. Now in the case of 
Thailand there was no change in the interest rate but there was some exchange rate appreciation starting 
around the 2006 period (perhaps due to foreign direct investment), perhaps this put pressure on the 
expected future exchange rate to appreciate so that 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎+1] decreases, if the government does not want 
to change its current interest rate then more capital will flow in thus putting pressure on the spot 
exchange rate (𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎) to also appreciate (to eliminate arbitrage opportunities). If the government wants to 
stop 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 from appreciating it could impose capital controls on inflows as Thailand did. As 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎+1] − 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 
remains negative due to the capital controls we see that these two terms move in opposite directions. In 
the case of Indonesia, perhaps the wake of the financial crisis made their rupiah currency uncertain. This 
put pressure on  𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎[𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎+1] to increase (depreciate). If the government wants a steady interest rate then 
this uncertainty would put pressure on 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 to depreciate as well (to eliminate arbitrage opportunities). To 
avoid 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 depreciation the government imposed large outflow capital controls during this time period. The 
case for India, China, and the Philippines is similar during this time period. 
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4.4 Alternative Tests of Monetary Independence 
 In the previous section, we investigated the trilemma relationship using a de 
facto measure of capital controls and a new measure of exchange flexibility but kept the 
traditional monetary independence regression (since it was also part of the same 
interest rate parity theory). In this section, we argue that perhaps a more appropriate 
measure of monetary independence should also include a measure of the country’s 
desired policy interest rate. Further, as the previous results were in levels regressions, 
we try to establish causality and also run a VAR model. Lastly this section concludes by 
comparing our results with a few recent papers from the monetary independence 
literature in Asia. 
4.4.1 The Taylor Rule as the Desired Interest Rate 
In an economically integrated world countries may go through similar business 
cycles for various reasons. Traditional monetary independence regressions do not take 
into account whether correlated movements of the interest rates may be due to the 
similarities in economic conditions and economic policies instead of a causal 
relationship. We thus include the country’s desired interest rate that would be chosen 
by its central bank in the absence of the external pressure from the base country. This is 
similar to Klein and Shambaugh (2013) who incorporate inflation and GDP growth in 
their regressions. Following Taylor (1993), we approximate the desired interest rate 
with the Taylor rule (TR).  
The TR interest rate is normally estimated from the actual data on inflation and 
output gap as follows: 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎, where 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 is the rate of inflation, and 
𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎 is the output gap – the percentage deviation of actual output from its full-
employment level. The fitted value of 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 is generally seen as the TR interest rate. 
Alternatively, one may obtain a TR rate using the parameters, (𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 𝛽𝛽3 = 1.0, 1.5,
0.5), originally suggested by Taylor (1993). To be consistent across countries we use the 
original parameters from Taylor (1993). As a robustness check we also estimate the 
Taylor rule for each country but the overall results remain similar. We follow Clarida, 
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Gali, and Gertler (CGG, 1998) and employ IMF data on CPI inflation and industrial 
production (or, if not available, unemployment). The cyclical component of a Hodrick-
Prescott filter is used on the log of deseasonalized industrial production to obtain the 
output gap. Unlike actual policy interest rate, the resulting TR interest rates are 
extremely volatile. This is not surprising as central banks tend to smooth interest rates 
(See CGG, 2000). We smooth the TR rate using a coefficient of .9.58   
 The TR interest rates are reported in the top portion of Figures 4.1-4.10, and it 
seems most countries only loosely follow the Taylor rule. A modified regression 
including the desired interest rate (𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷) is estimated as follows: 
(3)    𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷 + 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 
Table 4.6 reports the results. The coefficient estimate for the base rate remains largely 
unaffected with the exception of Indonesia. The coefficient on the desired rate is 
significant and correctly signed (positive) in five countries including China, Japan, India, 
Indonesia, and Thailand. There is also a significant improvement in the regression fit in 
those countries except China.  
Two cases – Indonesia and India – are interesting. 
Without considering the desired rate, Indonesia appears to have a one to one 
relationship with the base rate (Table 4.4). In the presence of the desired rate, however, 
its interest rate is almost exclusively determined by the desired rate and the coefficient 
on the base rate turns negative. This may be an indication that monetary policy making 
in Indonesia is more autonomous than what Table 4.4 implies. 
As can be seen, the regression fit is also improved for India, and unlike Indonesia, 
the base coefficient is actually higher after including the desired interest rate and so 
India is actually more monetarily dependent. The estimates indicate that India follows 
both the base rate and its desired rate. The base coefficient can be interpreted: holding 
                                                          
58 This parameter is taken from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), who report the parameter of different 
countries to lie between .87 and .95. The results remain similar if smoothing parameters in these ranges 
are used. To smooth the TR interest rate we use the formula: 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎ℎ = 0. 9 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎−1𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎ℎ + 0. 1 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
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the desired rate constant, a 1 percentage point increase in the base rate will increase 
the home rate by .57 percentage points. Figure 4.4 for India also confirms these results; 
it appears that before 2008 India closely follows its Taylor rule. After 2008 we see that 
India lowered its interest rate thus following the base rate; this appeared to cause the 
economy to overheat and inflation to rise thus further increasing the desired interest 
rate. India finally started raising interest rates in 2010 and thus deviated from the base 
rate.  
4.4.2 Short-Run Effects 
This subsection follows Cheung et al. (2008) and uses VAR analysis to establish 
causality and other relationships in the short to medium run. The first VAR uses the base 
rate and the home rate in first differences. The Bayesian Information criterion (BIC) for 
most countries indicates two lags as optimum. To be consistent across countries two 
lags are used for all countries. There is also an option to use a vector error-correction 
model (VECM) but it is not reported as the interest rates are not cointegrated with the 
base rate with or without adding the desired rate as reported by the Engle-Granger 
cointegration tests in Table 4.7.  
The results showing variance decompositions after the 3-month (short-run) and 
3-year (medium-run) horizons of the home interest rate explained by the shocks from 
the base rate and the home rate are shown in the first two columns of Table 4.8. Base-
rate shocks explain more than half of the variations in the home interest rate in the 
medium run in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea. On the other hand, they play a 
minimal role in China and Malaysia. Relative to the regression results it appears that 
Japan follows the U.S. rate more in the short run.  
The next three columns show results from a VAR with the desired interest rate 
included. It is ordered before the home rate on the assumption that it could 
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contemporaneously affect the home interest rate.59 The addition of the desired interest 
rate substantially reduces the contribution of the base shocks in Korea, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong. In four countries – India, Thailand, Korea, and Singapore – the shocks from 
the desired rate explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the home rate. Four 
additional countries – Malaysia, Japan, Philippines, and Hong Kong – are responsible for 
more than 10 percent of home rate variations. In only China and Indonesia, the desired 
rate shocks seem to play unimportant roles. 
Perhaps we are also interested to see how the home rate moves in response to a 
base rate shock. Impulse responses of the home and base interest rates to an 
innovation in the base rate in the three-variable model are presented in Figure 4.11.60 
These indicate that clearly China, Malaysia, and Japan are the most independent. The 
rest of the countries may also be considered on the independent side as their initial 
responses are not as large as the original shock, but there is a tendency to follow the 
base rate more closely afterwards (although there are large confidence intervals). The 
most dependent country again appears to be Hong Kong.  
4.4.3 Comparison with Other Studies  
 Various studies have examined the extent of monetary independence in Asian 
countries. Similarly to our paper, Ma and McCauley (2008) and Kohli (2012) use the NDF 
market to identify capital controls for China and India respectively. Their results show 
that indeed the two countries had large capital controls over the 2000s sample period. 
Ma and McCauley (2008) also test if capital controls enhanced monetary independence 
by noting that the Chinese exchange rate had been fixed to the dollar until 2005. 
Because of the fixed exchange regime, in theory the interest rate differential between 
the Chinese rate and the U.S. rate should be the same when there are no capital 
controls but the authors see that there is a substantial difference thus indicating that 
the capital controls are allowing monetary independence in China.  This indicates that 
                                                          
59 If it is ordered third the overall effect is a slight decrease in the Taylor rule shock but not enough to 
change the overall interpretation of the results. There is almost no change at the 3 month horizon, and 
there is only a few percentage point differences for most countries after the three year mark. 
60 The results are almost identical to the two variable VAR. 
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the capital controls were significant in helping China achieve monetary independence. 
The authors also have results that show the interest differential decreasing over time. 
We also see in Figure 4.1 that indeed the interest rate differential (the dark blue curve) 
has decreased in absolute value since 1999 and was close to 0 between 2002 and 
2005.61  
Kim and Lee (2008) also focus on testing monetary independence in East Asian 
countries from 1987-2002. They adopt a similar regression to eq. (2) however it is in first 
differences and also contains a lagged dependent variable. Because the sample includes 
the Asian financial crisis, some countries experience structural breaks and different 
regimes. Korea and Thailand had followed the U.S. base rate more closely before the 
crisis than after the crisis. Their results also indicate that Hong Kong and the Philippines 
appear to be monetarily dependent throughout the sample. On the other hand 
Malaysia, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have insignificant coefficients throughout the 
period and can therefore be considered independent. The authors argue that even 
though Malaysia had a period of fixed exchange rates after the crisis, its strong capital 
controls allowed it to be monetarily independent, but no formal testing is done. Overall 
our monetary independence results are more or less in line with these.  
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we studied the trilemma in the context of Asian countries. The 
advantage of our approach is that it allows us to look at specific countries in detail and 
determine how their capital controls and exchange rate flexibility influence their 
monetary independence.  The baseline results in Table 4.5 indicate that the most 
monetarily independent countries (based on the U.S. interest rate) either have high 
capital controls (China) or high exchange rate flexibility (Japan) or some combination of 
both (Malaysia, India, and Indonesia). The least monetarily independent countries have 
lower exchange rate flexibility and capital controls (Korea and Singapore). Hong Kong, 
                                                          
61 In a closer look, it looks as if China just wanted to have a stable interest rate during this period while it 
was the U.S. that was actually changing its interest rate. 
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the most dependent country has the lowest exchange flexibility and capital controls – 
this is because it officially has a currency board with the dollar and free capital mobility. 
Overall our paper is in support of the trilemma hypothesis.  
Further, as the world has become more integrated, economies have desires for 
similar monetary policies. We thus modify the existing monetary independence 
measure to include a desired interest rate component (based on the Taylor rule). First 
we incorporate the desired interest rate into the monetary independence regression for 
each country. In the regressions the most significant result is that Indonesia is strongly 
identified as monetarily independent. Further, we use a VAR to argue causality and to 
see how well the results hold up in the shorter run. The results show several countries 
that may be heavily exposed to the base interest rate shocks may have paid close 
attention to their inflation and business conditions in their monetary policy making. In 
particular, the variance decompositions show that taking into account the desired 
interest rate makes the most dependent countries - Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong 
appear more monetarily independent. This suggests that these countries have greater 
degree of monetary independence than what the conventional tests may implicate.   
Besides the empirical portion, an important contribution of this paper is in its 
approach in measuring the trilemma components. In particular, we are able to provide 
de facto measures of capital controls and exchange rate flexibility based on the covered 
interest rate parity condition. De facto measures on capital controls have also been 
constructed on China from Ma et al (2008) but they do not emphasize our measure of 
exchange rate flexibility. Interest rate parity has also been used to argue the trilemma in 
the past, but in practice authors only use it to form a measure of monetary 
independence.62 On the other hand various measures for capital controls and exchange 
rate flexibility have been used in the literature but they are only weakly based on this 
theory. The key to our paper is that we use the less risky non-deliverable forward 
market data (where available) to compute the trilemma components; these are 
                                                          
62 For example see Klein and Shambaugh (2015).  
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expected changes in exchange rates (the forward premium) and capital controls (taken 
as deviations from CIP). Comparing the capital controls with the existing de jure 
measures of capital controls also suggests there is validity in our results. To obtain the 
trilemma measures we then simply take the variation of these overtime. The variation 
of the interest rate differential could perhaps also be used as a monetary independence 
measure.  
Recently there has been a dilemma-trilemma debate. Rey (2015) notes that since 
the 1990s the world has become more financially integrated and the paper shows 
evidence that capital flows are highly correlated across countries. Further, the author 
argues that because of global financial cycles, countries may obtain monetary 
independence only by imposing capital controls regardless of their exchange rate 
regime. In a recent note, Klein and Shambaugh (2013) argues against Rey (2015) and 
provides evidence of the trilemma using the traditional methodology stated in the 
introduction. Our results also tend to support the trilemma hypothesis. As we can see 
from the results in Table 4.5, all countries except China rely on exchange flexibility more 
than capital controls. An extreme case is Japan which almost purely relies on exchange 
flexibility. More research is warranted as this study employs a small number of countries 
from Asia.   
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 Table 4.1 Exchange Rate Regime and Capital Controls 1999-2015 
Country 
Exchange Rate 
Regime 
SD (exchange rate 
change) KAOPEN 
China Managed float 3.88 0.84 
Malaysia Managed float 11.77 0.62 
Japan Free Floating 19.50 0.00 
India Floating 14.14 0.84 
Indonesia Managed  float 23.58 0.37 
Philippines Floating 13.42 0.63 
Thailand Floating 12.79 0.69 
Korea Floating 20.43 0.50 
Singapore Managed  float 9.44 0.00 
Hong Kong Currency board 0.79 0.00 
Note: KAOPEN is Chin-Ito (2008) capital control index, estimation is based on data availability for 
each country from 1999-2015. See Appendix E. 
 
 Table 4.2 Augmented Dicky Fuller Test 
   
 
                DF                   Critical   Values 
               Statistic 1% 5% 10% 
USA -3.484 -3.48 -2.849 -2.568 
China -1.369 -3.485 -2.93 -2.642 
Malaysia -1.417 -3.48 -2.892 -2.607 
Japan -2.707 -3.48 -2.826 -2.546 
India -1.983 -3.48 -2.825 -2.546 
Indonesia -2.863 -3.489 -2.941 -2.653 
Philippines -3.366 -3.494 -2.831 -2.552 
Thailand -2.851 -3.48 -2.826 -2.546 
Korea -2.844 -3.48 -2.838 -2.557 
Singapore -3.224 -3.465 -2.824 -2.545 
Hong Kong -2.753 -3.462 -2.824 -2.545 
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 Table 4.3 Capital Control Announcements 
Country Events 
Hong Kong 
Source: Asia 
Business council, 
June 2010 
2010, Hong Kong implemented several controls to prevent capital 
inflows. 
India 
Source: Patnaik 
and Shah (2012) 
2007.8, India implemented a quota on foreign debt and forbid 
exchange borrowed foreign currencies into Rupee, to regulate huge 
capital inflow.  
Indonesia 
Sources: Titiheruw 
and Raymond 
(2008); Singh 
(2010) 
2001 and 2006, there was restrictions on rupiah transactions and 
foreign currency loans by the Bank of Indonesia. 
2009, Bank Indonesia issued restrictions on short-term capital flows. 
 
Korea 
Source: 
IMF’s AREAER 
2010.6, to manage a huge capital flow, Korea imposed capital controls 
on currency derivative: local commercial banks’ currency derivative 
products cannot be worth more 50% of the bank’s capital; the number 
is 250% for the local branch of foreign banks. Also impose interest tax 
on bond investment. 
 
Thailand 
Source: Feng and 
Liu (2013) 
2003 and after, Thailand implimented controls on inflows to stabilize 
exchange rate (prevent appreciation). Short-term debt cannot exceed 
50 million Thailand Baht per resident. The balance of non-resident’s 
Baht account cannot exceed 0.3 billion.  
2006, Thailand imposed controls on inflows. Local banks cannot issue 
any financial products to non-residents.  
2006.12-2008.3 URR: 30% of foreigners’ money, that is used for bond 
investment in Thailand, should be saved with no interest in central 
bank of Thailand for one year. The money may then be returned to the 
owner one year later. 
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 Table 4.4 Baseline Regressions 
VARIABLES China Malaysia Japan India Indonesia Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Hong Kong 
                      
Base Rate 0.00948 0.0836*** 0.0388*** 0.321*** 0.980*** 1.083*** 0.350*** 0.577*** 0.428*** 0.920*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0200) (0.00720) (0.0554) (0.119) (0.102) (0.0284) (0.0250) (0.0159) (0.0162) 
Constant 0.0239*** 0.0307*** 0.00167*** 0.0740*** 0.0741*** 0.0386*** 0.0200*** 0.0277*** 0.00358*** -0.00903*** 
 
(0.00115) (0.000528) (0.000163) (0.00204) (0.00248) (0.00290) (0.000780) (0.000677) (0.000241) (0.000340) 
Observations 179 188 202 201 176 172 200 202 190 197 
R-squared 0.001 0.098 0.104 0.122 0.245 0.452 0.489 0.714 0.876 0.948 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
 
Table 4.5 Sample Standard Deviation of Trilemma Components 
  China Malaysia Japan India Indonesia Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Hong Kong 
Capital Control       3.97 2.62 0.12 2.32 5.20 2.77 6.81 1.16 1.09 0.19 
Forward Premium (∆𝐷𝐷) 3.66 3.19 2.05 2.98 6.30 4.49 7.21 1.56 1.79 0.52 
Interest Differential 2.31 2.07 2.11 2.39 3.08 2.58 1.62 1.22 1.28 0.50 
Changes in exchange rate  3.88 11.77 19.50 14.14 23.58 13.42 12.79 20.43 9.94 0.79 
Observations 179 188 202 201 176 172 200 202 190 197 
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Table 4.6 Regressions with Desired Interest Rate 
 VARIABLES China Malaysia Japan India Indonesia Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Hong Kong 
 
                    
Base Rate 0.0269 0.0849*** 0.0216*** 0.572*** -0.388*** 1.177*** 0.401*** 0.565*** 0.431*** 0.892*** 
 
(0.0272) (0.0276) (0.00696) (0.0461) (0.0860) (0.148) (0.0208) (0.0255) (0.0158) (0.0152) 
Desired Rate 0.0553*** 0.0111 0.0550*** 0.278*** 0.965*** -0.103 0.0889*** 0.0126 -0.0181*** 0.00186 
 
(0.0144) (0.0287) (0.00990) (0.0304) (0.0373) (0.104) (0.00466) (0.0306) (0.00442) (0.00495) 
Constant 0.0212*** 0.0301*** 0.00161*** 0.0364*** -.0256*** 0.0447*** 0.0155*** 0.0277*** 0.00418*** -0.00726* 
 
(0.00109) (0.000954) (0.000215) (0.00364) (0.00377) (0.00638) (0.000572) (0.00175) (0.000335) (0.000430) 
Observations 179 185 199 198 145 172 174 197 188 188 
R-squared 0.039 0.111 0.319 0.392 0.866 0.457 0.757 0.713 0.883 0.951 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
        
 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                 
 
Table 4.7 Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
 
Base Rate and Home Rate 
 
Base Rate, Home Rate and Taylor Rate 
 
         
 
statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 
10% 
Critical 
China -1.21 -3.959 -3.371 -3.068 
 
-1.242 -4.376 -3.789 -3.5 
 Malaysia -1.411 -3.956 -3.369 -3.067 
 
-1.253 -4.373 -3.788 -3.5 
 Japan -1.5 -3.951 -3.367 -3.066 
 
-1.345 -4.367 -3.784 -3.5 
 India -1.188 -3.952 -3.367 -3.066 
 
-1.999 -4.368 -3.784 -3.5 
 Indonesia -1.482 -3.96 -3.371 -3.069 
 
-2.39 -4.396 -3.801 -3.5 
 Philippines -2.271 -3.961 -3.372 -3.069 
 
-3.14 -4.379 -3.791 -3.5 
 Thailand -1.474 -3.952 -3.367 -3.066 
 
-2.282 -4.378 -3.791 -3.5 
 Korea -1.856 -3.951 -3.367 -3.066 
 
-1.955 -4.368 -3.785 -3.5 
 Singapore -2.452 -3.955 -3.369 -3.067 
 
-2.722 -4.372 -3.787 -3.5 
 Hong Kong -3.566 -3.953 -3.367 -3.066 
 
-3.05 -4.372 -3.787 -3.5 
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Table 4.8 VAR Variance Decompositions of Home Rate 
 
  Original 
 
                                with Desired Rate 
 
Base rate 
Shocks 
Home rate 
Shocks 
 
Base rate 
Shocks 
Desired rate 
Shocks 
Home rate 
Shocks 
China 
3 month 0.9 99.1 
 
0.8 0.4 98.8 
3 year 2.3 97.7 
 
2.6 2.7 94.7 
Malaysia 
3 month 0.5 99.5 
 
0.3 3.2 96.6 
3 year 3.7 96.3 
 
5.5 18.6 75.8 
Japan 
3 month 24.7 75.3 
 
23.9 1.9 74.2 
3 year 42.2 57.8 
 
41.3 16.0 42.7 
India 
3 month 6.3 93.7 
 
6.6 0 93.4 
3 year 15.5 84.5 
 
18.8 26.2 55.0 
Indonesia 
3 month 2.5 97.5 
 
3.8 .3 95.9 
3 year 21.5 78.5 
 
32.7 3.5 63.8 
Philippines 
3 month 1.0 99.0 
 
1.1 1.0 97.8 
3 year 40.1 59.9 
 
39.6 10.7 49.7 
Thailand 
3 month 27.2 72.8 
 
37.1 6.3 56.6 
3 year 46.6 53.4 
 
45.2 27.0 27.8 
Korea 
3 month 24.3 75.7 
 
22.1 11.3 66.6 
3 year 66.8 33.2 
 
41.3 28.1 30.6 
Singapore 
3 month 41.6 58.4 
 
37.5 0.4 62.1 
3 year 58.3 41.7 
 
38.7 22.6 38.7 
Hong Kong 
3 month 72.3 27.7 
 
70.2 0.4 29.5 
3 year 94.0 6.0 
 
74.3 17.7 8.1 
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  Figure 4.1 China 
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 Figure 4.2 Malaysia 
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 Figure 4.3 Japan 
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 Figure 4.4 India  
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 Figure 4.5 Indonesia 
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 Figure 4.6 Philippines 
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 Figure 4.7 Thailand 
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 Figure 4.8 Korea 
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 Figure 4.9 Singapore 
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 Figure 4.10 Korea 
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 Figure 4.11 VAR 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Data 
Data on the value of bilateral exports comes from IMF – Direction of Trade Statistics. 
The DOT reports data on both exports and imports. To obtain this value, both sets of 
data are used in that the average of 𝑗𝑗’s imports from 𝑖𝑖 and the exports to 𝑗𝑗 from 𝑖𝑖 is 
taken. Over a fifth of observations have values missing for either of the two in which 
case only the non-missing value is used for exports. 
Data on GDP, exchange rates (used to convert into U.S. dollars), the U.S. GDP deflator 
(used to convert into real values), population (used for gdp/capita), oil price (Brent 
Crude), and the real effective exchange rate, all come from IMF – International Financial 
Statistics. Following Glick and Rose (2002) the GDP data is supplemented using the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
The price of oil varies depending on its grade and location. Brent Crude is high grade oil 
found in the North Sea. It is used as an international benchmark as to how world oil 
prices behave. The oil price is average annual “spot” Dated Brent crude oil price. 
Data on Free Trade Agreements comes from Frankel (2010), and The World Bank – 
global preferential trade agreements database. 
The distance is calculated using latitude and longitude coordinates of the geographic 
center of the countries as defined by the CIA – The World Factbook. The alternative 
measure of distance is calculated using the coordinates of the capitals of the countries, 
which are also obtained from The World Factbook. Stata’s globdist command is used to 
calculate the great circle distance between any two sets of coordinates. 
For the additional oil price measures: The West Texas Intermediate comes from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/OILPRICE.txt), and the Dubai Fateh from the 
World Bank – GEM Commodities. 
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Appendix B: Selected Country Sample 
 Industrialized Countries 
Australia Greece New Zealand 
Austria Hong Kong Norway 
Belgium Ireland Portugal 
Belgium-
Luxembourg Israel Singapore 
Canada Italy Spain 
Denmark Japan Sweden 
Finland South Korea Switzerland 
France Luxembourg United States 
Germany Netherlands United Kingdom 
   Additional Countries 
Algeria Kuwait Thailand 
Argentina Malaysia Turkey 
Bangladesh Mexico Ukraine 
Brazil Nigeria United Arab Emirates 
Bulgaria Pakistan Venezuela 
Chile Peru Vietnam 
China Philippines 
 Colombia Poland Former countries 
Czech Republic Russia Czechoslovakia 
India Saudi Arabia Eastern Germany 
Indonesia Slovakia U.S.S.R. 
Iran South Africa Yugoslavia, SFR 
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Appendix C: The AvW Model 
The AvW (2003) model is technically just a simple general equilibrium model of 
world trade. The model assumes that each country produces 1 good – a unique product. 
Each country is also a representative consumer and has a CES preference function that 
includes every country’s good including its own. For each country 𝑗𝑗 the utility can be 
expressed as: 
(1𝑎𝑎)      𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = ��𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
1−𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎−1
𝜎𝜎
𝑖𝑖
�
𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎−1
 
Where: 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents 𝑗𝑗’s consumed quantity of country 𝑖𝑖′𝑌𝑌 good. The summation is over 
all countries, which implies that 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the own good consumption of j. It is assumed that 
goods are treated as substitutes rather than compliments in which case 𝜎𝜎 > 1.  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is an 
additional preference parameter that is specific to country 𝑖𝑖′𝑌𝑌 good and is the same for 
all countries. In particular, the higher the 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 the less valuable the 𝑖𝑖′𝑎𝑎ℎ  good is to the 
other countries.  
In order to consume the goods, each country has to buy them. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be the 
price that country 𝑗𝑗 pays for good 𝑖𝑖. Prices of good i will differ across countries 
depending on the trade costs between countries 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. These may include shipping, 
tariffs, and others.  Let 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 be the production price of good 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑖𝑖. Assume that 
the destination price in 𝑗𝑗 is higher by a factor of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 – the trade cost. Then 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
There are also internal trade costs where: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Here, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be the 
trade cost factor within the country (the internal trade cost). Generally, the local good is 
not bought directly from the factory, and so 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be seen to include the additional 
cost of transportation and taxes that are paid. 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is likely to differ across countries. If 
one assumes that production takes place in 1 location, then a larger country will likely 
have a higher 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
From the definitions above, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total value of goods bought 
from i by j. This can also be viewed as value of exports from i to j, or value internal 
consumption for 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Country j chooses how much of the goods to buy and is 
constrained by its GDP. In this case, the budget constraint for country j is:  
(2𝑎𝑎)          �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
≤ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 
On the other hand, GDPs are just the sum of the values of what is exported and what is 
used for internal consumption. In this case for country i this is:  
(3𝑎𝑎)         �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
= 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 
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Maximizing (1𝑎𝑎) subject to (2𝑎𝑎) implies that: 
(4𝑎𝑎)        𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)1−𝜎𝜎
∑ (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
 
In this model the GDPs (𝑌𝑌), the trade costs (𝑎𝑎), and 𝜎𝜎 are assumed exogenous, and the 
prices (𝑝𝑝) (and quantities (𝑎𝑎)) are assumed endogenous. Ultimately, one is interested in 
solving for the value of exports from i to j ( 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) given these exogenous variables. The 
equations above are defined for all countries and so this can be done using (3c) and (4c), 
along with a particular standard /normalization of the prices63. 
 To be consistent with AvW define:  
(5𝑎𝑎)         𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = ��(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)1−𝜎𝜎
𝑖𝑖
�
1/(1−𝜎𝜎)
 
Then replacing (4c) into (3c) 
obtain: ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)
1−𝜎𝜎
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖.  Define:  
(6𝑎𝑎)     Π𝑖𝑖 = ��
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
�
1/(1−𝜎𝜎)
   ∀𝑖𝑖 
Then (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 and plugging back in (4𝑎𝑎) implies  
(7𝑎𝑎)              𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
 
Π𝑖𝑖  is known as the exporter resistance to trade, while 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the importer resistance to 
trade. 
Now instead of solving for the prices, it is easier to solve for Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎, 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎.  Plugging 
in (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)1−𝜎𝜎  = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 into (5c) implies:  
(8𝑎𝑎)     𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = ��
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
Π𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
�
1/(1−𝜎𝜎)
  ∀𝑗𝑗 
When trade costs are symmetric, i.e. 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  then the unique solution to 
(6𝑎𝑎) 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (8𝑎𝑎) is 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = Π𝑖𝑖 . As stated in AvW this implies a particular normalization of the 
prices. Then using either (6𝑎𝑎) (or (8𝑎𝑎)) one can solve for the 𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 given values for the 
                                                          
63 Intuitively, a normalization is required because the total value of GDPs is known but quantities and 
prices are not. Therefore, prices are only solvable up to a ratio without a normalization. The solution for 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 will be exactly the same given any normalization. 
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trade costs, gdps, and sigma. In section 2.5, the gravity equation (6) additionally 
multiplies the numerator and denominator by world GDP. Therefore the 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 in (6) also 
has a world GDP in its denominator. 
Theoretical Predictions of Oil Price Impact 
 Unlike the traditional gravity equation, the GE gravity equation also contains the 
multilateral resistance terms. As these terms vary by country and are a function of trade 
costs and GDPs, the effect of oil prices on trade will not only vary by distance, but will 
also vary by country pair. To see this more clearly, consider the trade cost function to 
be: 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖64  ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 . Where 𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an interaction variable, and 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
are other trade costs independent from oil prices.  Now taking the derivative of the log 
of eq. (6) w.r.t. oil price, and assume no change to GDPs ⇒ 
(9𝑎𝑎)     
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
= (𝜎𝜎 − 1) �
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
+
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
−
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
� 
To predict how trade will change, it is important to solve for 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
 , and 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
.  To do this 
take the total differential of eq. (7) ⟹ 
0 =
−𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + ��
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 +
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹
𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 +
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
+
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�       ∀𝑗𝑗 
Following AvW, 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
 , and 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
 can easily be solved when the model is at the frictionless 
equilibrium65. So assume that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1  ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 𝑔𝑔 = 0 ⟹ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1. Further, I 
am assuming that only oil prices, and therefore multilateral resistances change. In this 
case 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 0. Then: 
(10𝑎𝑎)    0 = −(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + ��(𝜎𝜎 − 1)𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔�
𝑖𝑖
     ∀𝑗𝑗 
Dividing by (1 − 𝜎𝜎), multiplying by 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, summing over all 𝑗𝑗, and using the fact that 
∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 ⟹ 
                                                          
64 Here it is not necessary to multiply by  𝑔𝑔 – the main effect of oil price.  As mentioned in footnote 1, a 
change in the “overall” trade costs (such as a multiplication by a constant for every country-pair during 
the same period) does not change the behavior of trade.  All that matters for this model is how the trade 
costs relate to each other and multiplying them all by some factor will not change this relationship. 
65 The frictionless equilibrium assumes that trade costs are the same everywhere; then trade between 
countries is solely determined by their GDPs. In this case all trade costs are set to equal 1.  
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(11𝑎𝑎)    0 = −2�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
+ ��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
     ∀𝑗𝑗 
(11c) into (10c) implies  
(12𝑎𝑎)   
𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
= −��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
     ∀𝑗𝑗 
(12c) into (9c) implies  
(13𝑎𝑎)66   
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔
= (𝜎𝜎 − 1)�−��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
− 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
�      ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 
In the traditional gravity model, 
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
  depended on just the distance between 
the two countries and the level of oil price. For that model, neither the economic size of 
the countries nor their world location mattered as to how trade decreased. However, it 
is clearly seen from (13c) that the higher the country specific terms: ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
the less decrease in trade there will be. In particular, the change in trade will also 
depend on the GDPs of the two countries and their distances to the rest of the world.  
 To see how the change in trade depends on GDPs, first consider internal 
distances (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) to be small relative to distances across countries (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Then as seen from 
(13c), ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  will be smaller the larger (GDP wise) the countries’ trading. 
This means that given the same distance, two countries with larger GDP shares (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖s) will 
have their trade decrease by more relative to two countries with smaller GDP shares. 
This is the same conclusion as AvW (p.176).  From looking at eq. (6), the logic here is 
that countries with very large GDPs have high internal consumptions (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) relative to 
their GDP. When oil prices increase, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 will only increase by a small percentage in order 
to soak up the loss international trade (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Therefore, P𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎−1  will not increase by a large 
factor and international trade will decrease by a larger percentage for these larger 
countries. Alternatively, consider an extreme case where country 𝑖𝑖 has 99% of world 
GDP, then clearly after an oil price increase, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 will not increase by a large factor (as 
that will imply 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 >𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖). Therefore, P𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎−1 will only increase a by a small percentage 
relative to all other P𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎−1. 
On the other hand, consider the role location plays. First it can be seen that the 
term −𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗  in (13c) implies that an increase in the oil price will decrease trade by 
more for the greater distance. This is the same conclusion as in the traditional gravity 
model. However, the GE model also has the additional MR terms. This implies that there 
will be additional trade changes depending on the location of the countries with the rest 
                                                          
66 The same results are obtained from the approximation by Baier and Bergstrand (2009), due to their 
approximation also being around the frictionless equilibrium. 
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of the world.  Consider two countries at a set distance apart. If the two countries in 
question are very isolated, then ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  will be high and their trade will not 
decrease as much as if they were not as isolated. The logic behind this is that if they are 
not isolated, they can easily divert trade to the many countries close to them. However, 
if they are isolated they will not be able to divert trade as easily and mainly just increase 
internal trade / consumption of own good.  
This additional trade effect, however, is evaluated starting at a frictionless 
equilibrium. In reality, the system could be far from this equilibrium. It is likely that the 
more isolated the country, the greater the trade costs and therefore the greater the MR. 
When there is an oil price increase the already high MR will not increase much further67. 
Therefore, this mitigates the previous result, and the two results might actually 
counteract each other so that there will be no difference regarding the role of location. 
This implies that conclusions about additional trade changes based on isolation cannot 
be made from the above analysis.  
  
                                                          
67 Suppose country 𝑖𝑖 is very isolated, this is a case similar to country 𝑖𝑖 having a large GDP.  Then its MR (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) 
is very high and if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is reasonably low, this implies that internal trade (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) will be high and its 
international trade (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) will be low. When there is an increase in trade costs (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), international trade will 
fall. Because international trade is low to begin with, internal consumption is high and only a small 
percent increase in it will be enough to soak up the fall in international trade. Therefore, there will only be 
a slight increase in 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 . 
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Appendix D: GE Proof 
Proposition:  For the three step process in determining the general equilibrium impact of 
a policy, it does not matter what the internal trade costs are set to - in the end the 
counterfactual trade level will be the same.  
Here the strategy is to use two different sets of internal trade costs and to show 
that they lead to the same counterfactual trade level using the 3 step procedure from 
section 2.5. 
The first step is to obtain the MRs and trade costs using each of the of the two 
different internal trade costs. Let the first set of internal trade costs be {𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎} ∀𝑖𝑖. Let 
the alternative be denoted with a star subscript {𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎} ∀𝑖𝑖. Let all results associated with 
the alternative also be denoted with a star subscript. Now suppose that the relationship 
between the two different trade costs is 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 ∀𝑖𝑖  where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  is just the number 
that will make the equation hold. Then using (6) one can calculate the MRs and the 
other (international) trade costs given the internal trade costs, the given trade levels, 
and the GDPs. For the first set of internal trade costs, let the calculated MRs be 
{𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎} ∀𝑖𝑖, and the calculated international trade costs be {𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎}  ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗   𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. Then for 
the second set of internal trade costs the calculated international trade costs, and MRs 
will be {𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎},  {𝑃𝑃∗𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎}. As the internal trade equations in (6) are used to solve for the 
MRs, it can easily be seen that 𝑃𝑃∗𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 = �𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 ∀𝑖𝑖. This in turn implies that 𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 =
�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎.  
After obtaining all the trade costs, step 2 suggests implementing a policy that will 
alter the trade costs. This is done by multiplying 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎  by a specific policy term 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Then 
using (7) the MRs are recalculated using these new trade costs. Denote {𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎} ∀𝑖𝑖  be 
the solutions to (7) and the new after policy MRs. Then (7) ⇒ 
(1𝑎𝑎)      1 =
1
P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
��
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
�     ∀𝑗𝑗 
Now for the alternative internal trade costs this ⇒ 
(2𝑎𝑎)      1 =
1
P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
��
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
� =
�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
��
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
�   ∀𝑗𝑗 
Since (1d) = (2d) = 1 then P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 = �𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∗ P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎 ∀𝑗𝑗 is the one unique solution to (2d). 
 Now for the 3rd step, denote the counterfactual trade levels with an N 
superscript. Then for the 1st and 2nd set of internal trade costs this implies:  
      𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤
�
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
�
1−𝜎𝜎
∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗    𝜎𝜎 > 1         𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 
 
122 
    𝑇𝑇∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤
�
𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎P∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
�
1−𝜎𝜎
=
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
�
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
�
1−𝜎𝜎
∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗    𝜎𝜎 > 1 
Then it is clearly seen that 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and this completes the proof. 
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Appendix E: Data Description 
Monthly data is gathered on countries based on data availability for the following 
periods in year.month 
USA                1999.1-  2015.9                   with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2015.9                    
China             1999.1 – 2013.11                with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2013.11                    
Malaysia       1999.1 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2015.7                    
Japan             1999.1 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2015.7                    
India               1999.1 – 2015.9                 with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2015.6                   
Indonesia      2001.3 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 2001.3-  2013.3                    
Philippines    1999.1 – 2013.4                  with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2013.4                    
Thailand        1999.1 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 2001.1-  2015.8                    
Korea             1999.1 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 1999.1-  2015.5                   
Singapore      1999.8 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 1999.8-  2015.8                    
Hong Kong    1999.6 – 2015.9                  with Taylor Rule: 2000.1-  2015.8                    
 
Data on the 3 month interbank interest rates, exchange rates, forward rates, and NDF 
rates taken from Bloomberg.  
Data on Industrial Production, Unemployment and inflation is taken from the IMF – 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Appendix F: The NDF Market 
The non-deliverable forward (NDF) market is a market for forward currency 
contracts where physical currencies are not exchanged. In Asia these markets are 
located in Singapore and Hong Kong and 60 to 80 percent of activity is for speculative 
purposes. For a description see Misra and Behera (2006), Lipscomb (2002), and Shamah 
(2008). In our countries’ sample China, India, Korea, and the Philippines had formed an 
NDF market since 1999. Indonesia joined the list in 2001. The last market that joined 
was Malaysia in 2005. Thailand does not have an official NDF market as it is discouraged 
by the Thai government; as stated in Misra and Behera (2006) there is an implied threat 
to participation of foreign banks that have branches in Thailand. 
The market transaction is best illustrated by an example. Consider the NDF 
market for the Indian rupee. The transaction involves two counterparties. Both 
counterparties start the transaction by giving each other a fixed amount of rupees (on 
paper). The agreement is to return the rupees exchanged in dollars in the future period. 
One counterparty states an exchange rate that it would exchange the rupees for in the 
future period (this is the NDF exchange rate) while the other exchanges using the actual 
realized rate in the future period; no physical currency is exchanged and this is only on 
paper. Due to differences in the NDF and realized future exchange rate one 
counterparty will have more dollars than the other (on paper); the net difference is then 
settled in dollars and transferred to one of the counterparties.  
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